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West Papuan refugees 
forcibly deported to Jayapura 
During the past two months, the Papua New Guinea government's treatment of the West Papuan refugees has deteriorated 
dramatically, highlighted by the brutal repatriation of twelve men on 12 October and by the threatened forced 
repatriation of at least 2 7 more. These deportations were in fact only the latest of a series of secret deportations. 
On 21 November, Michael Somare was removed from office by a vote of no confidence. His successor, Paias Wingti, is 
leader of the People's Democratic Movement. The day after taking office, he told AFP he was "happy at the state of 
relations with Indonesia" and that he admired Lee Kwan Yew's style of leadership. The. coming to power of a new government 
means that all pressure should be brought to bear on it to change the disastrous policy of its predecessor. But it must 
be stressed that the policy is very much the creation of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the police and intelligence 
forces. Unless drastic changes tak.e place at this level, the refugees will continue to be in grave danger of deportation. 
A furtive operation 
Under cover of dark, early in tne morning of 12 
October, a group of refugees some of whom who had been 
taken from Telefomin camp to Vanimo, were escorted by 
armed PNG police onto a flight to Jayapura, capital of 
Irion Joya. Altogether 16 refugees were to have been 
deported, but four had escaped before reaching Vanimo and 
fled into the bush. When the 12 refugees realised in mid-
flight what was happening, a fight broke out, forcing the 
pilot to return to Vanimo. Several witnesses report that 
the men were then beaten up by the police (Times of PNG 
13 October), handcuffed and forced back onto aircraft for 
the flight to Jayapura. 
On arrival, they were arrested by the Indonesian 
authorities and were then subjected to prolonged 
interrogation for at least 2 weeks. (Koni:>as, 29 October) 
It is not difficult to imagine the maltreatment and 
torture they have suffered since then, and the Indonesian 
press has reported that some at least are likely to be 
charged with subversion. 
At least seven of the deported men had long ago 
expressed a wish to re-settle in a third country. Their 
names were on a list of 31 refugees in Blackwater and 
Telefomin camps, which was sent to TAPOL in August. 
Efforts to find sanctuary for these refugees have so far 
foundered on the inability of the UNHCR to convince any 
states to accept them, despite the desperate situation in 
which the refugees are placed. 
Acting Foreign Minister deliberately misleads the court 
About 12 hours before the deportations took place, 
Father John Etheridge, Bishop of Vanimo learnt of the 
plans and informed lawyer Bernard Narokobi, who 
immediately applied to the court for on injuction. This 
was refused because no copy of the deportation order 
could be presented. In fact, the deportation order had 
been signed by the Foreign ,Minister, John Giheno, on 4 
October just before leaving for the Commonwealth 
Conference, but Acting Foreign Minister, Tony Bois 
deliberately misled the court, stating that no 
deportation order had been signed. 
Acting on this false information, the judge refused to 
grant an injunction with calamitous consequences. Twelve 
men were delivered, bound, to their persecutors, and 
refugees at Blackwater exploded in anger at this 
grotesque injustice. They now face charges for "illegal 
assembly" and guilty verdict!. could result in their own 
deport at ion. 
Two hundred refugees in Blackwater camp walked the 
several miles to Vanimo to protest the deportations. (The 
Australian, J 6 October) They attacked several government 
buildings and the office which had chartered the aircraft 
used. A week later, on 19 October, their camp was 
surrounded and searched for "offensive weapons" by the 
police. All the men, a total of 108, were rounded up and 
taken into custody, to be formally charged. Already two 
of them, Sam Marakena and John Rumbino hove been jailed 
"for possessing home-mode bombs". (Sydney Morning Herald, 
16 October} 
Background to the 12 October incident 
Although Indonesia has publicly conveyed the impression 
that repatriation of West Popuans is a matter for PNG 
alone, there is no doubt that the deportations are part 
of a process of strengthening its links with Indonesia. 
What Jakarta needs above all from PNG is proof that it 
will stamp out anti-Indonesian activities on its soil. 
What better way of doing this than handing back OPM 
activists to Indonesia? 
It was clear in the months before 12 October that 
relations between PNG and Indonesia were getting very 
much warmer, in contrast to the acrimonious exchanges 
that occurred last year. General Surano, Minister-
Coordinator for Political and Defence Affairs attended 
PNG' s 10th anni versory celebrations and announced plans 
to carry out exchanges of journalists, students and 
senior politicians and officials, while the Indonesian 
press has recently been unusually flattering about PNG. 
In September, the Joint Border Commission met in Rabaul 
with Indonesia's Interior Minister, General Roestam 
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Soepardjo attending, the first time an Indonesian 
minister has attended border negotiations, and on 30 
September, a "Memorandum of Understanding" on border 
issues was signed. The contents of this Memorandum have 
not been disclosed, nor has anything been revealed about 
any discussions in Rabaul regarding the refugees. 
PNG Provincial J,ntelligence approves deportatio,ns 
At the very time the Rabaul negotiations were taking 
place, a far more secret meeting took place in Vanimo on 
26 September, with depoftations very much on the agenda. 
This was a meeting of the West Sepik Provincial 
Intelligence Committee which drew up a list of 27 
refugees to be deported as soon as possible, in addition 
to those who were deported on 12 October. 
The confidential minutes of this meeting were leaked 
and have circulated widely. They reveal that behind the 
cloak of an apparent lack of clear PNG government policy 
regarding the refugees, the police and intelligence 
services are resolutely pursuing a policy of deportation, 
Gross misuse of \,Jl..jHCR funds planned by PNG border 
police 
The minutes of the 26 September meeting of the West 
Sepik Provincial Intelligence Committee (PIC) which 
names 27 West Papuan refugees who are to be deported, 
makes it clear, as the following quotations reveal, 
that police and intelligence off iciols pion to use 
UNHCR funds to round up West Popuon refugees for 
deportot ion: 
"PPC {the Provincial Police Chief, Joel Kean} 
mentioned that the onllJ walJ to have these WI's [West 
lrianese, for West Papuans} returned is for our own 
officers to travel and get hold of them ••.• PSL 0 {the 
Provincial Securitlj Liaison Officer} painted out that 
BA 0 {Border Administration Officer} has two separate 
funds, that is UNHCR and Border Admin funds and he 
should use either of these funds for Officers to 
travel and get hold of these Wl's. Whilst waiting for 
BL 0, we request BA 0 {a member of the PI C, though he 
was not present at the meeting} to release funds from 
the UNHCR accounts and have two (2) or three (J) 
officers to travel to work this walJ." 
"PIC resolves that BL 0 liaise with Immigration for 
funds and two officers to travel to various locations 
and get hold of those Wl's who absconded from 
Blacl<water Camp." 
The deportations were delayed till Indonesian border 
officials returned to Jayapura 
The minutes also stated that the first deportation, 
of the 16 refugees (of whom 4 escaped) was to hove 
token place on the day of the meeting (26 September) 
but "due to Indonesian officials in Rabaul attending 
JB C [Joint Border Committee} it will be executed next 
ThursdalJ ( Jrd October)". The P IC "hereblJ resolved 
that the deportation of sixteen (16) deportees be 
deferred until the arrival of Indan Officials in 
Jaljapura." [As we know, these deportations took place 
on 12 October.] 
TAPa... hos asked the UNHCR whether any of its funds 
hove Indeed been used for such i llegol put-pases cmd 
has asked for assuconces that such things will not be 
allowed to happen. There must surely be on 
investigation into these criminal activities of the 
PNG border police. 
with the approval of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Since 
moreover, the government has failed to grant formal 
refugee status to any of the refugees, there is nothing 
to prevent the police from carrying out deportations on 
whatever pretext they wish. 
Many of the refugees in PNG ore well-known opponents of 
Indonesian rule in West Papua, the very people the 
military regime would like to get their hands on. There 
is now growing evidence of close cooperation between the 
PNG police in the border provinces and the securi~y 
forces in Irion Joya. and in November, the West Sep1k 
chief-of-police, Joel Kean, visited Jayapura with on 
eight-man delegation, to give a clean bill of health on 
Indonesia's treatment of returned villager-refugees. 
It now appears, from a statement by Colonel Bu.ntaron, 
chief-of-police in Irion Joya, that the deportations on 
12 October were only the latest of seven such group 
deportations and that some of those previously expelled 
from PNG h~ve been sentenced to two or three years in 
jail. (Asiaweek. 8 November) 
But what of the UN-ICR? Although the agency ~as been 
involved in providing physical sustenance for the 
refugees, it has been prevented from carrying out its 
protection work to determine wh£> of the approximately 
12,000 West Popuans now in PNG should be granted refugee 
status. The agency was not given a chance to ascertain 
the status of the deported men and was not even informed 
that anyone would be sent bock. ( Asiaweek, 8 November) 
Widespread protest 
The Somare government was heavily criticised both at 
home and abroad as soon as news of the 12 October 
criminal deportations broke. Both the Prime Minister and 
the Foreign Minister were at the Commonwealth Conference 
at the time. Deputy Prime Minister, Father John Momis of 
the Melanesian Alliance, tried to assuage public opinion 
by issuing a long statement outlining what he proclaimed 
was a new and more humane policy towards the refugees. 
The statement contained numerous weaknesses which TAPOL 
criticised in a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister. But 
the nature of Morni s' policy has now become largely 
academic with the fall of the Somare government, and all 
efforts need to be concentrated on urging the Wingti 
government to abandon the disastrous policy of its 
predecessor, and accord the refugees proper protection. 
Protest in Australia has been expressed by many 
organisations and in the columns of the press. Amnesty 
International launched an urgent action in mid-October, 
expressing fears that the 12 men under arrest in Jayapura 
could be tortured. The London-based organisation, 
Survival International, hos also issued an urgent action, 
colling on the PNG government to stop deporting refugees. 
STOP PRESS 
Four deportees returned in June were all killed 
A report has just reached T APOL from o well-connected OPM 
source in Jayapura that oil four West Popuans who were 
deported to .Jayapura on 24 June 
have been killed. Nabot Warvna 
who had been a corporal in 
Battalion 751 in lria"' Joya and 
deserted in February last year, 
was deported by the PNG 
authorities together with three 
civilia,ns, Izak Waeomi, Ones 
Sorontouw ond Abrahan 1-bnong. 
Initially, Hamong was 
released while Werma was taken 
to theMilitory Corrmond HQ and 
the other two were held at 
Panorcrna, the interrogation 
centre of the parocomnondos 
(Kopassus). Then all three were 
transferred to !far Gunung 
Prison, outside Jayapura, and 
shot dead there early in .July. 
Abraham Hamong was re-
arrested on 8 July and held at 
POM (Military Police HQ). He 
was taken from his cell on the 
nisjlt of 9 July and murdered in 
Borowai, near Lake Sentonl. 
Izaak Rumpaisum 
who was deported 
o.n 12 October 
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Australia tries to keep 
refugees out 
Australia has now become embroiled in the West Popuan 
refugee iss¥e. In addition to five West Popuans who 
reached Australia's Thursday Island in the Torres Strait 
last June, another three arrived on Boigu Island in 
October. Although the lrrmigrotion Minister, Christ~pher 
Hurfood, hod decided that the first five would not be 
granted refugee status, the government-appointed 
Determination of Refugee Status Corrmittee contradicted 
him by finding that the men were genuine refugees. Faced 
with such a humiliating rejection of his decision, the 
Minister announced that he was returning the report to 
the Corrmittee "for clarification". {The Australian, 31 
October) 
There are signs that Hurfood in fact favours a policy 
of accepting West Papuan refugees but only as their 
second country of refuge, after they have made their way 
to Papua New Guinea. This apparently has the advantage 
for Australia of discouraging Papuans within canoe-ride 
distance from making their way south for refuge rather 
than going east. Indeed for anyone in the southern 
district of Merauke wishing to escape from Indonesian 
harassment, a sea voyage is less risky than travelling 
overland to PNG. 
But both Prime Minister Hawke and Foreign Minister 
Hayden ore adamant that, come what may, no West Papuons 
will be given refuge in Australia. Canberra is by now so 
bent on currying favour with Jakarta that it is not 
likely to "jeopardise" relations with the generals' 
regime for the sake of a few Popuans. There ore even 
regrets being expressed in Australian government circles 
that the islands in the Torres Strait are Australian 
territory. Life would have been so much easier had PNG 
been allowed to take control! 
As one writer aptly put it: "A government that shouts 
its humanitarian credentials from the rooftops ••. risks 
looking just a little silly when it is thrown into 
confusion by the arrival of a few unarmed tribesmen at 
its own bockdoor." {The Age, 2 November) 
More refugees ready to enter Australia 
Robin Osbourne reports (The Australian, 12 November) 
that up to 16 more West Popuons hove made their way to 
the southern tip of PNG, 4 km from Boigu Island, ready to 
make the crossing to Australia, but they have been 
positively discouraged by officials who told one of their 
number when he land on Boigu that it was government 
policy not to accept refugees from West Papua. 
THE GUERILLA STRUGGLE IN IRIAN JAYA 
ROBIN OSBORNE 
Robin Osborne's newly-published bool< will soon be 
available to TAPOL readers at a price to be announced 
shortly. 
The story of Manibesak 
By Constantinopel Ruhukail, now a refugee in T elefomin, 
Papua New Guinea 
I first got to know Arnold Ap well in 1969 when he was 
studying geography at the Faculty of Pedagogics at 
Cendrawasih University (Uncen). At the time I was only in 
the second grade of the Jayapura Teachers Secondary 
School in Abepura. We first became friends through the 
Church, in the Christian Youth Choir. It was a friendship 
based on a talent we both shared and on the love we 
shared for art, in particular traditional music and 
drama. Often on Christian holidays we performed dranas 
based on religious themes with friends like Sam Kapissa, 
Andy Usjor and Demson Rumbewas. 
It was from these beginnings that we developed our 
interest in artistic activities. In 1978, a group of us 
including Sam Kapissa, Marthiny Md. Sawaky, Tony Wolas 
Krenek, Joel Kaf iar and Berth Tenawani decided to turn 
our attention to developing traditional Melanesian music 
and dance in West Papua. On 4 August, we set up the 
Mambesak Group at the Museum of Anthropology of 
Cendrawasih University. This was a folk-song group 
dedicated to encouraging and popularising people's songs 
and traditional West Papuan dance to the outside world. 
Popularising Papua song and dance 
Since Arnold happened to be head of Uncen's Museum of 
Anthropology, this became the base for our Mambesak 
activities. Every afternoon, we sang, danced, held 
exhibitions and made recordings on Museum premises. 
During those years, we devoted almost all our time and 
energies to developing regional art and culture forms 
through the Mambesak group. 
The group spread its wings from Uncen Museum to other 
regions outside Jayapura, and art groups came into being 
all over the place, all serving the same purpose. A 
feverish interest in people's songs spread far and wide, 
from the towns into the villages. Mambesak became more 
and more popular among the native people especially after 
cassettes of Volume One of the Collection of Irion Joya 
People's Songs recorded by Mambesak began to circulate in 
the regions. 
The West Papuan people began to make the switch from 
Indonesian pop music to their own regional music. The 
strains of the Mambesak group singing could be heard in 
homes throughout the country, especially among the native 
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people. It was as though the West Papuan people had 
rediscovered something of their very own which had been 
bu ri ed for years. 
Protecting the envirorvnent 
We then began to turn our attention to the protection 
of the environment. In 1980, Mambesak became involved in 
environmental campaigns concerned in particular with the 
sea around Jayapura and the Cendrawasih Bay which was 
already polluted by explosives being used by coastal 
fishermen from Sulawesi and Buton. 
From 1978 to November 1983 when Arnold was arrested, 
the two of us regularly broadcast on the Pelangi Art 
Progrcrrme on Nusantara V Jayapura ffiI (Indonesian Radio) 
station every Sunday afternoon, speaking the Irianese 
dialect of Indonesian which is an excellent means of 
communicating with the people of West Papua. 
These were the things the two of us became involved in, 
together with Sam Kapissa, Marthiny Sawaki, Tony Wolas 
Krenak, Berth T anawani, Demi anus Wariap Kurn i, Eddy Mofu, 
Marthi nR.Jmabar, AulemanR.Jmbewas and Danny Mandowen, all 
of us members of the Mambesak group which now exists in 
name only. As enthusiasts and heirs of the noble values 
of our regional culture, we tried to make Mambesak its 
means of growth. But in political eyes, our activities 
were seen as a grave threat to national resilience. 
Mombes~ a 'threat to national security' 
I still remember clearly how in November 1979, a year 
after Mambesak was born, three of us, Arnold, Sam Kapissa 
and myself, were summoned by the Provincial Military 
Command (Laksusda/Kodam XVII) and interrogated on the 
origins and aims of the Mambesak group. Already in those 
early days, the security forces were paying special 
attention to the activities of our Mambesak group. They 
saw Arnold and his Mambesak as a group that had revived 
the people's love for their own regional culture, thus 
obstructing the process of development. This was at 
variance with government policy for a programme of 
cultural assimilation. Mambesak was therefore seen as 
laying a foundation that might one day threaten the 
spirit of national unity. 
The security forces continued to watch the group 
closely and in 1982, Laksusda had already made up its 
mind to dissolve the Mambesak group for reasons of 
national security. Without doubt, they had come to look 
upon Arnold and his Mambesak group as a dangerous threat 
to security in the region and to the government's policy 
of cultural assimilation. 
These susp1c1ons ultimately led our two beloved 
friends, Arnold Ap and Eddy Mofu to their tragic end. 
They both fell victim to an act of gross inhumanity. 
Those beautiful experiences I shared with Arnold and 
Eddy will remain with me as long as I live. 
Acheh: Spotlight on torture 
Barbarous tortures of political prisoners are being practised daily in jails throughout A cheh, Sumatra. The following 
account, supplied to TA POL by the National Liberation Front of Acheh Sumatra, describes methods of torture currently used 
tiy Indonesian army personnel on political prisoners, suspected members or sympathisers of the Front. Prisons where these 
forms of torture are known to have been practised, according to the Front, include Kedah Military Prison in Kutaraja, 
Bandar Acheh, Sigli Prison, Langsa Prison and Lhok Seumawe Prison. 
l) The legs of heavy steel chairs are placed on the 
prisoner's toes. An interrogator then sits on the chair, 
soon causing blood to gush forth. 
2) The flesh on the shins is scraped with the sharp nails 
of a soldier's boot until the bone is bared. 
3) Burns are inflicted on all parts of the body, E:ven 
inside the nose and ean, until the prisoner's body is 
covered with wounds. 
4) Prisoners are dipped head first in a barrel of water, 
with hands tied behind their backs. They are pulled out 
after losing consciousness. Upon regaining consciousness, 
the process is repeated. 
5) High-voltage current is applied to the genitals until 
the prisoner loses consciousness. This treatment almost 
always inflicts permanent damage on the genitals. 
6) The prisoner is made to stand in a barrel of water so 
that he/she must stand on tiptoe in order to breathe. 
Then a huge block of ice is placed on the head and the 
prisoner is left like this until losing consciousness or 
until the ice melts, which can take up to four hours. 
7) The prisoner is placed in sewage containing human 
excrement. The nostrils are punctured by fish-hooks 
attached to lines manipulated by interrogators. If the 
prisoner manages to hold the head free, the filth is 
sprayed on his/her face. 
8) The prisoner must stand with legs wide apart and both 
hands tied and pulled towards the back in opposite 
directions. An interrogator climbs on the prisoner's 
knees. Fifteen minutes of this treatment can result in 
paralysis for at least 6 months. 
9) The hands are tied behind the prisoner's back for 
months on end. This treatment often drives the victim 
mad. 
10) A prisoner is bound by the neck and pulled in 
opposite directions until losing consciousness. He/she is 
rev ived with a bucket of cold water then subjected to the 
same torture again. 
11 ) A prisoner is made to lie on a concrete floor, then a 
log of tirrber is placed on the body and an interrogator 
jumps on the log until the prisoner loses consciousness. 
This treatment can also break bones. 
12) Women are stripped naked, the ultimate humiliation 
for any Achehnese woman. 
13) Thorny durian fruits are used to scrape a prisoner's 
face until badly disfigured. 
14) A prisoner is clubbed in the face. One prisoner, 
Teuku Shari fuddin, lost both eyeballs and was in such a 
frightful state that the soldiers shot him dead. The 
death certificate gave 'heart failure' as the cause of 
death. 
15) Muslim prisoners are humiliated by being forced to 
drink alcohol and having it sprayed on their faces. 
16) Younger prisoners are forced to masturbate, then to 
swallow their own semen. 
17) Pubic hair is pulled out. 
18) The prisoner is pushed into a mud-pool full of 
buffalo excrement. The head is forced downwards until the 
prisoner loses consciousness. 
* • * * * 
Many prisoners die while being tortured. When this 
happens, the body is carried away in a plastic bag and 
the deceased is said to have died of 'natural causes'. 
A primary objective of such treatment is to break the 
victim's self-respect. Other forms of psychological 
pressure are used such as telling a prisoner her/his 
parents hove died, or saying that a man's wife has been 
unfaithful, in an attempt to destroy his morale. 
Sometimes a prisoner is threatened with execution, and 
even taken to the place of execution, keeping up the 
pretence till the last moment. 
In supplying this information to TAPOL, the National 
Liberation Front of Acheh, Sumatra urges human rights 
organisations to turn their attention to these massive 
violations and calls for support to its struggle for 
Achehnese freedom from the Indonesian colonial regime. 
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Fretilin invites UN Secretary General 
for consultations 
In a radio message to Lord Avebury, chairman of the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group, transmitted from East 
Timor on 20 October, 1985, Kay Raia Xanana Gusmao has 
invited the UN Secretary-General to a meeting with 
Fretilin leaders. On 25 November, Lord Avebury conveyed 
this invitation to Mr Peres de Cuellar. 
To explain the background to this important new 
development, we publish extracts from the recent exchange 
of messages between Lord Avebury and Xanana Gusmoo. 
* * * * * 
The following is an extract from Lord Avebury's radio 
message to Xonana: 
Now the United Nations has called on the Secretarlj 
General to use his good offices to find a solution (to 
the East Timar question) in consultation with all parties 
concerned. We have continually pressed the Secretary 
General, and the governments of . the countries which 
supported the resolution, to acknowledge that the people 
of East Timar are the most important of all the parties, 
and we have asked what steps have been taken to consult 
you, either bl) means of a visit of the Secretary General 
or his representative to East Timar, or by extending an 
invitation to your leaders to meet him on neutral 
territory such as Australia. Maybe you could tell me 
whether any approach has been made to Fretilin on this 
important matter. 
If the answer is that you have received no 
communication from the Secretary General, would you be 
prepared to invite him to meet you? And if so, could you 
let me know so that I could pass this information on to 
the Secretary General? 
I realise that the military situation may make it 
difficult for him to visit East Tim or, though it would be 
possible in theory for the UN to offer to arrange a 
truce, with perhaps a small UN force to monitor it. What 
would you think of that idea, or alternatively, would you 
agree to meet the Secretary General in Darwin, if he 
would arrange passage out vf East Timor and back again 
afterwards for your representatives? 
* * * * * 
In his reply, Xanana said: 
In the face of the formidable difficulties surrounding 
our struggle, Lord A vebury, we recognise from the very 
depths of our souls the great and incontestable loyalty 
of our friends. We ask th<!.t they continu~ to support East 
Ti mar and to persuade governments to change their 
policies and support the UN Secretary General's efforts 
to find a just solution for a firm and lasting peace in 
East Ti mor. We would also like to add that, as far as we 
know, neither the UN nor its Secretary General has 
attempted to make contact with Fretilin. We would 
therefore fully agree to the suggestions you have 
presented to us. We feel that a meeting between Fretilin 
and the Secretary General would be a necessary 
developmentin our campaign and an important step towards 
ending the suffering of the Maubere people. With regard 
to the prospect of a visit to East Timar by the Secretary 
General, we declare that there are no preconditions for 
this on our part because we want to ensure that the 
Secretary General is free to fulfil the task entrusted to 
him by the UN General Assembly. We also declare that 
there are no preferences on our part regarding the choice 
of locale. The meeting could be held in Dili, or the 
Secretary General can go to any town in the interior of 
the country readily within our reach. If the Secretary 
General were unable to come to East Timar, we would be 
amenable to having a delegation of ours meet him in 
Darwin. 
We are extremely grateful for the sentiments expressed 
by you, Lord Avebury, and we accept your kind offer. We 
hereby agree to extend a formal invitation to the 
Secretary General to meet with Fretilin leaders. The 
meeting could take place in East Ti mar or abroad, 
providing that, in the latter case, the delegation can 
enjoy the security due to them during their travels. 
We know ... [the message is garbled for a few words] the 
facts of this initiative, but we have absolute faith in 
our belief that you, Lord A vebury, will spare no effol't 
in support of the heroic effort of our people. Your 
affirmation that no-one must consider ours a lost cause 
does not just provide moral support. It holds inestimable 
significance for us as we conclude the tenth anniversary 
of our resistance to the power which has so brutally 
occupied our homeland. As you have made us realise, one 
struggle may also lead to greatel' peace and stability for 
all human beings. 
Support the Fretilin invitation to the UN 
Lord Avebury asked TAPOL to reproduce the above 
extracts from his exchange of messages with Fretilin 
leader, Xanana. He also appeals, through the columns 
of TAPOL Bulletin, to all our supporters and readers 
to draw the attention of their governments and MPs in 
their country to the Fretilin initiative, and to 
mobilise support for it. The invitation is in line 
with UN General Assembly resolution 37/30 adopted in 
1982 which asked the Secretary General "to initiate 
consultations with all parties directly concerned, 
with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a 
comprehensive settlement of the problem". 
TAPOL is reproducing the full texts of the radio 
exchanges of TAPOL and Lord Avebury with Fretilin in 
its new series, Occasional Reports. These are 
available on request. Single copies supplied gratis. 
A charge will be made for larger orders. 
DETGRYMMA 
SPELET 
The Gruesome Game: Sweden's role in Indonesia's Genocide 
in East Timar 1975-85 is published by the Swedish East 
Timor Corrmi ttee. 
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Fretilin greets T APO L 
The following is a message from Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, leader of Fretilin, chairman of the Revolutionary Council of 
National Resistance and Commander-in-Chief of Falintil, the East Timorese armed resistance movement, to TA POL. The 
message was transmitted by radio from East Timor to Australia on 21 October 1985. 
We send our warm fraternal greetings and our gratitude 
for TAPOL's solidarity in struggle. To all the members of 
TAPOL, we wish to say that we have the same enemy. The 
Indonesian militarists make no distinctions among their 
victims, in order to perpetuate their oppression over two 
fraternal peoples. We realise that the struggle of our 
people for the liberation of our homeland is part of the 
struggle of the fraternal people of Indonesia for the 
restoration of democratic liberties in their homeland. 
The fraternal people of Indonesia and the heroic people 
of East Timor are today both gagged in the same way, and 
in East Timor, their prison warders are not only the 
murderous nanggalas 1) but the mighty killing machine ot 
the bloodthirsty generals in Jakarta. The blood of 
hundreds of thousands of our people has joined the river 
of blood tho t flowed from the murder of mill ions of 
Indonesians. It is not an empty phrase nor a vain hope 
when we say that, because of our struggle, we believe 
that the democratic forces in Indonesia will recognise 
our determination, and will be able to find more adequate 
forms of recognising too our fundamental right to the 
independence of our homeland. 
Indeed, the predominance of RPKAD2) officers in key 
positions ... means incontestably that ... but we believe 
that the Indonesian people will not allowed themselves to 
be fooled for ever by the TNI (Indonesian Army) who say 
that 'ada program-program besar' [great prograrTTTies (of 
development) are under way]. 
In our own country we are only too familiar with the 
bloody scenes of children crying and the horrifying 
screams of adults who have become real-life actors in the 
drama of these 'program-program', for it is in order to 
secure the implementation of these 'program-program' that 
at least one RA<.AD battalion is stationed in each 
concelho (district}, with anggotas (members} of the RPKAD 
spread out even to the remote corners of our country. 
[The next sentence is incomprehensible because of a gap.] 
l--lowever bad the atrocities perpetrated in Indonesia, 
those corTTTiitted in our country are worse - against women, 
children, old people, young people, against adults, 
against everyone, with the sole exception of the few 
servile lackeys who get everything they want. 
War crimes help promotion prospects 
Not only does the war situation in East Timor provide 
Xanona Gusmoa with Colonel Purwanto, at the negotiations 
between Fretilin and the Indonesian Army of occupation in 
Morch 1983. 
an opportunity for rapid promotion for AERI3) officers. 
The best opportunity for promotion for RA<.AD soldiers is 
the number of arrests and tortures and above all the 
number of massacres they perpetrate against our people. 
As a resull·, Kodim4) officers even compete against each 
other and, in order to obtain faster promotion, encourage 
Extracts from TAPOL's message to Fretilin 
The following are extracts from a radio message by 
Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL to Fretilin in September, 
1985: 
Many of us in Western Europe, in different 
organisations, are working together to support your 
right to self-determination, in Sweden, Denmark, 
Ireland, France, West Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, 
Holland and the United Kingdom. We meet regularly to 
discuss and plan our activities. Most governments in 
this part of the world only want to see Indonesia as 
a market for their exports and a profitable arena for 
capital investment, so they close their eyes to the 
reality of Indonesian rule while competing with each 
other to sell weapons to Affil. 
Si nee Benny M.irdani became A ERi commander- in-chief, 
thepredominanceofRPKAD-trained officers has become 
greater than ever. Many regional corTTTiands and top 
positions in AERI as well as in the state apparatus 
are now in the control of RPKAD men, most of whom 
have the blood of the East Timor people on their 
hands. It is acknowledged that active service in the 
war against your people is the best guarantee for 
quick pramotion even though these nanggala murderers 
have failed to defeat you after so many years •••• 
I very much agree with your proposal that a team of 
independent observers including Amnesty International 
representatives should visit East Timor to make a 
thorough investigation of conditions but we all know 
how difficult this will be because of the Indonesian 
blockade. Perhaps we should try to break the blockade 
the other way round, by receiving a mission from you, 
with people from areas under your control and from 
the concentration camps.... I realise that such 
people would almost certainly not be able to return 
home to continue the struggle but the sacrifice of 
their loss to you might be worth while because of the 
impact such a visit would have on world opinion. 
hansips5} to cut off the heads of defenceless people 
living in the bush whom they capture, as evidence of 
their operations against the guerrillas. Moreover, if one 
nanggala captures five members of the population of a 
concentration camp, an intel official will capture six, 
and the dandim {kodim corTTTiander) will order ten suspects 
f·o be fetched for torture. They all engage in a wild, 
bloody competition for the greatest number of prisoners 
that the war situation permits. 
For Indonesian soldiers in general and for the 
nanggalas in particular, a Maubere citizen is nothing 
more than an animal for slaughter. Nevertheless, this has 
not succeeded in weakening for a single moment our 
determination to struggle until the enemy is defeated. On 
the contrary, this has inculcated in us a stronger will 
to continue the struggle and a clearer realisation of the 
need to liberate our homeland in order to liberate our 
people. 
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History has repeatedly shown us that unless the 
movement and the people of a country fight for their 
rights, governments that talk demagogically, their mouths 
full of principles and rights, will close their eyes to 
the violations of these principles and rights. Apartheid 
in South Africa for example has not worried, nor does it 
now worry, western governments any more than the 
dictatorships in Chile, Paraguay, the Philippines, 
Indonesia and so on upset them, causing them to devote 
some attention these countries. We are well aware of 
this. If the brutal repression in South Africa today 
provokes comments and a certain degree of interest, with 
timid demands being made by some governments for 
sanctions, this is because the economic interests of 
these countries in South Africa are under threat. At 
root, it is not on behalf of the rights of the black 
population of South Africa that many western countries 
are now hesitantly and reluctantly using this rhetoric. 
What has made the difference is the qualitative 
development in the struggle of the Azanian people, the 
determination with which the black population of that 
country faces repression and death in order to defend 
their right to overthrow the intolerable white-minority, 
racist regime and the way it has won support from ever-
growing international condemnation of the regime. 
An unshokable will to win 
From the start of the Indonesian aggression, we 
realised that our struggle would be difficult and very 
arduous, and that it would demand from all true 
nationalist patriots firmness of conviction and an 
unskakable will to struggle. Our national liberation 
struggle continues to be firm and will be increasingly so 
in the future. We are well aware of the military power of 
AERI but our slogan is: Struggle, struggle, struggle 
until victory. The past ten years have shown the 
determination of our people to carry forward its 
resistance. The guerrillas of Fretilin know that they are 
dying for a sacred cause, the liberation of their country 
and of the Maubere people, and they accept the sacrifice 
of their lives with a smile of confidence, and with the 
courage which our ancestors displayed in the wars of 
independence. Although subject to a blockade which seeks 
to cut all links with the outside world, the Maubere 
people have continued to direct their efforts to 
reinforcing steadily their heroic resistance, confident 
in the certainty of victory, and believing that we have 
contributed by our liberation struggle to the liberation 
of the oppressed peoples of the whole world. 
Breaking the blockade which conceals the truth is crucial 
Jakarta's brazen and stubborn refusal to lift the 
blockade of East Timor which is more effective than an 
iron curtain in preventing independent observers from 
coming into contact with the true condition of our 
people, is a crucially important aspect of our struggle. 
We call it crucial because it encapsulates all the 
---· 
·:::::::::.·· . ....:~~- -·-·----==::::::..· "THERE IS NO FRETILIN ... 
contradictions and inconsistencies in Jakarta's 
propaganda as well as providing underlying testimony to 
the truth of our victories. 
We therefore regard the idea that we should send a 
Fretilin delegation abroad as logical, and one which has 
many important implications. It would give us a better 
chance thoroughly and objectively to unmask not only 
Jakarta's lies but also the false image which all sorts 
of visitors who have been manipulated by the Indonesian 
generals have been trying to project around the world 
about the situation in East Timor. 
We want to thank you in advance for any efforts you can 
make to this end in order that together, we may make it 
possible for the struggle of the Maubere people to make a 
significant advance towards a difficult but certain 
victory. 
Abroad, the Maubere people will always value the 
support given by its friends, a necessary complement to 
the activities carried out by its external wing, the 
Fretilin External Delegation. We recognise that the 
militarist Indonesian regime has, in all respects, an 
overwhelming superiority in the unequal war that has been 
forced on our people, and for that reason, we continue to 
need your constant support to defend our rights, to 
publicise our struggle, to denounce the crimes committed 
by the forces of occupation, and to encourage 
international public opinion to wage a campaign of 
pressure on their respective governments to ensure that 
the people of East Timor are not denied their inalienable 
rights. This work also supports the efforts of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to work for a 
just solution of the conflict in the light of the 
principles laid down in the United Nations Charter and 
the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. 
For our pprt, we affirm our complete solidarity with 
your struggle, the struggle of TAPOL, in the sincere 
conviction that now more than ever, the efforts of both 
of us should be better coordinated since the crossing of 
our paths has given us a cornrnon platform for our 
struggles. We stand in solidarity with the fraternal 
people of. Indonesia, in solidarity with the democratic 
forces opposed to Jakarta's militaristic fascism, and in 
particular, in solidarity with the political prisoners, 
victims of the bloody regime, like our own people who 
have been herded into concentration camps. 
The struggle continues on all fronts! 
H9rneland or death! 
To resist is to win! 
Kay Raia Xanana Gusmao, Commander-in-Chief of Falintil. 
1) nonggala: a knife-cnrr}ing soldier. This is how the 
Timorese refer to all the killer-paracommandos. 
2) RPKAD: the first name for the elite paracommando 
regiment, later changed to Kopassandha, then Kopassus. 
A m on g the Tim orese, the origin al name has stuck. 
J) ABRI: Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. 
4) Kodim: District Military Command. 
5) hansip: civil guards. 
FRE-TIUN O<tS NOT E~\ST ... 
f\U. IS PEACE. AHO HARMON'{ 
, .. fRETIUN WHO? 
NT News, 25 July 1985 
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according to a report of the 
Revolutionary Council for 
Na t i on al Res i stance ( CRRN), 
broadcast by Radio Maubere on 16 
September 1985. 
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- . ~ Areas under Fret iii n control. 
,. ,,.• Towns and roads in the hands of 
,.;,," Indonesian troops. 
According to the ~N report, 
Indonesian control does not 
extend beyond 2 to 8 krns around 
each village or concentration 
camp throughout the country. 
Indonesian colonialism 
in East Timor 
"I feel the Timorese are not open. They do not speak out, as if they're hiding something. I would like them to open up." 
A young doctor from West Java working in East Timor 
quoted in Asioweek, 2 August 1985. 
"People, myself included, we feel as if we are in a jail in our country. The only people who go in and out of Timar are 
the Javanese." 
Ten years after the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 
1975, East Timor displays all the hallmarks of a 
colonised territory. All the efforts of the military 
regime to 'integrate and develop' East Timor serve a 
single purpose, to convince the outside world that 
Timor's integration is an inevitable and irreversible 
historical fact. 
Jakarta's '27th province' has become the focus for 
pembang11nan (development) "so as to catch up with the 
development of the other provinces tsic) of Indonesia". 
(Indonesian Embassy Press Release, Bonn, 3 Septerrber 
1985) According to Indonesian propaganda, extra efforts 
are needed to 'catch up' because of the 'backwardness' of 
East Timor and its population. Per capita expenditure is 
higher in East Timor than any 'other' Indonesian province 
and it also has more civil servants per capita on the 
government payroll, a total of 10,050. Behind the fantasy 
of Indonesian statistics is the reality exposed by Mgr 
Belo who, when asked to comment on the huge sums Jakarta 
is pumping into East Timor, replied: ''The only problem in 
Timor is the problem of freedom of the inhabitants." 
( AFP, 8 August 1985) 
In the same interview, Mgr Belo likened East Timor to a 
jail. It is the jail called East Timor, or more precisely 
those parts under Indonesian administration, that is the 
subject of this article. We have carefully studied 
Indonesian propaganda material and the mass of reports 
that appear in the Indonesian press, analysing the 
information with the help of what we know from church 
sources and letters smuggled out. 
Indonesia's chief civiliCD'l administrator in Dili 
Since his appointment as governor of East Timor in 
October 1982, Mario Carrascalao has become the focus of 
Indonesian media attention. He is repeatedly interviewed 
Fretilin-controlled areas exist in several 
regions (See map opposite) 
A Fretilin military corrmunique transmitted by radio on 16 
Septerrber 1985 reports that Fretilin has established 
stable areas of control in several regions. The areas are 
inhabited by civilian families, in some places as many as 
fifty families (not related to the guerrillas). Normal 
village pursuits toke place and each base has an elected 
5-member revolutionary democratic council and its own 
centre of national resistance (cernac). The councils all 
have women members. 
The Revolutionary Council of National Resistance is the 
supreme.resistance organisation with representatives from 
all the Fretilin-controlled areas and from areas under 
Indonesian control. It also includes representatives of 
Falintil, the guerrilla movement, and brigade commanders. 
It thus provides political and military leadership, 
including leadership of the diplomatic struggle abroad. 
The establishment of the radio link has enormously 
facilitated the consultations and exchange of views 
between the internal leadership and Fretilin's External 
Delegation. 
Mgr Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East Timor 
in an interview with AFP, 8 August 1985. 
by foreign as well as Indonesian journalists. Any public 
appearance or statement he makes, in Dili or in Jakarta, 
is widely reported, and he often appears in photographs 
together with Suharto or Murdani, to emphasise that he 
has their full backing and blessing. He is often 
acclaimed as the experienced administrator in charge of 
pembangunan in Indonesia's '27th province'. 
Carrascalao is certainly more suited to Jakarta's needs 
than his predecessors and has been allowed to function 
more prominently as governor. He has proven capable of 
serving Jakarta well as a man with administrative 
experience, sometimes promoting moves to 'clean up' 
corruption and inefficiency and appearing to be in charge 
of the huge bureaucracy in East Timor. Whereas before 
1983, foreign journalists and diplomats on guided tours 
of East Timor would be briefed primarily by the area's 
military commander and the Sekwilda (Regional Secretary), 
a position always held by u military man, Carrascalao has 
been the main spokesman since then. The emergence of 
'Governor' Carrascalao has helped to 'civilianise' and 
'Timorise' the administration at a time when East Timor 
remains Jakarta's most vulnerable target of international 
condemnation. 
Carrascalao comes from one of East Timor's richest 
families with huge interests in coffee-growing. Jakarta's 
decision to restore the family's 521 hectares of coffee 
land in 1980 was instrumental in winning him over ro 
their side. Although he started out in life strongly pro-
Portuguese, it required no major adjustment to become as 
fervently pro-Indonesian; in other words, he is a typical 
'native' colonial administrator, working loyally with 
whatever system has asserted itself. 
He has displayed a remarkable adjustment to the 
arrogant style of Indonesian bureaucrats, sporting their 
official safari dress, smoking their kretek cigarettes 
Mario Carrascalao always gets the spotlight when Suharto 
meets provincial governors. (Jakarta Post, 1 July, 1985} 
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and propagating their Pancosilo ideology. He freely 
accepts the Jakarta view of East Timorese as a 'backward 
people', and is indeed a prime advocate of this view. Nor 
does he gainsay Jakarta's condemnation of Portugal's 
'centuries of neglect' for East Timar although up to 
1975, he believed that East Timar should remain a 
Portuguese province. 
A military project 
But for all Corroscalao's prominence, East Timor is 
primarily a mili tory project. In late 1983, centralised 
control of the East Timar military command structure was 
reinforced when Kostrad, the Army's Strategic Reserve 
Command, set up a Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan 
Timar Timur (Operational Command for the Restoration of 
Security in East Timar) to take control of all military 
and security operations in the region. Thus while Colonel 
Rahardjo, commander of Korem Wira Dharma, the sub-
regional military command based in Baucau is under Kodam 
IX/Uda1Jana, the Nusatenggora regional military command 
based in Bali, he is at the same time operationally under 
Kostrod's special East Timor Corrmand. The first corrmander 
of this Command was Brigadier-General Sugi to of the para-
commandos (Kopassus) who has recently been appointed 
commander of the crucially important Jakarta Military 
Command, a post that always goes to an officer highly 
regarded by the Armed Forces !eadership. (See Military 
Profile in this Bulletin.) We do not know who has been 
appointed as Sugito's successor in East Timar. 
Unlike Colonel Purwanto who, as East Timar Korem 
corrmander, entered into negotiations with Fretilin in 
March 1983 and enjoyed a high profile, Colonel Rahordjo 
tokes a low profile and is rarely mentioned in the press. 
(Colonel Purwonto's immediately successor was Colonel 
Rudi to who was apparently taken ill and died not long 
after he took up the post.) 
Rahardjo's troops are responsible for security and 
order in the pemukimans or concentration-camp villages 
where the vast majority of East Timorese live. At this 
level, civil administration as the local extension of 
Carrascalao's bureaucracy has virtually no role to play. 
It is Army control that is the reality for people in the 
countryside, not the fantasy world of development 
projects which Carrascalao and the bureaucrats so 
energetically promote. 
The troops on operational and territorial duties in 
East Timer are continually replenished with troops from 
Java. Thus, for instance, Infantry Battalion 403/Wiro 
Sada Prati sta of Jogjakarta has been on one-year stints 
doing 'territorial guidance duty' in East Timar three 
times since 1975. (Indonesia Reports, No 11, September 
1985, quoting Kedaulatan R~at, 27 August.) Troops of 
the Air Defence Artillery Regiment l of Jakarta Military 
Command, the regiment involved in shooting down 
demonstrators in Tonjung Priok in Septerrber 1984, hove 
regularly served in East Timar. (Indonesia Reports, 
quoting Angkatan Bersenjato, 21 August) 
The colonial bureaucracy 
East Timer is administered by a bureaucracy the upper 
echelons of which are composed of civil servants brought 
in from various ports of Indonesia. According to Lincoln 
Kaye (Far Eastern Economic Revie~ 8 August 1985), 
posting to East Timar is coveted by ambitious officials 
not only because of premium salaries, which now include 
'hardship' bonuses of up to 95%, according to a 
presidential decree introduced earlier this year, but 
also because a stint in East Timor promotes career 
prospects. These special bonuses ore also paid to 
Indonesians working in health, education and the 
military. Since the military alone account for well over 
10,000 people, the burden on East Timor's 'high per 
capita' budget of these inflated Indonesian salaries is 
clearly enormous. 
d ll II tch" Besides Carrascalao's "handpicke , top-no . 
ad-ninistrators (to use Kaye's turn of phrase)
1 
brou.ght. i~ 
from all parts of Indonesia to run his provincial 
administration, the development programnes i~ East Timor 
are run by the Kepala Kantor Wilayah {Kakanwil) or Heads 
of Regional Offices representing ail tne Jokarta-?a.sed 
government departments. These Kakanwi~ are all off icia~s 
from Java or Bali as is patently obviously from their 
names which frequently appear in the Indonesian press. 
They control the prograrrrnes and activiti~s mapped out for 
East Timar in Jakarta. Moreover, since 1978, the 
administration of East Timar has been the responsibility 
not of the Interior Affairs Department but of the 
Department of Defence and Security. . 
The civil service in East Timer now consists of 10,050 
people but as Carrascalao himself admits, many are 
Timorese who are kept on the payroll without being 
required to do a job of work because, he asserts, if they 
work, "they can hurt people". (Asiaweek,, 2 August 1985) 
Many of these Timorese worked for the fo~mer Portugu~se 
colonial administration or were brought into the service 
by Corrascaloo's predecessors, both of them from the 
Apodeti party. They appear to come low in Corrascalao'.s 
estimation though he seems keen enough to buy their 
loyalty. 
The Jakarta government is always boasting about the 
large sums of money poured into its '27th province'. 
There is little the outsider can do to examine the 
reliability of official figures, but some simple 
comparisons make their claims suspect. For instance, 
Antaro News Agency claimed in July this year that 
expenditure in East Timar in the past nine years hos 
amounted to $320 million {Jacarto Post, 19 July), but 
according to a Press Release of the Indonesian Embassy in 
Bonn {3 September 1985), it was $361 mill ion. The rupiah 
equivalents showed on even greater discrepancy ••• in the 
opposite direction! Antara said it was Rp 350 billion, 
while the Bonn Embassy's figure was Rp 278 billion. 
For fiscal 1984/85, the budget was given as $66 million 
with $20 million for routine expenditures, $23 million 
for development projects and $23 million for Inpres 
In national gatherings, it is the Timorese participant 
who invariably gets the spotlight. Here, Mrs Suharto 
'symbolically' pins a badge on a Tlmorese woman at a 
Pancosila indoctrination course. {.1alca.rta Post, 16 June) 
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(special presidential decision) projects. The routine 
budget was more than double the previous year's figure of 
$9 million due to the sharp rise in the number of 
government officials. Carrascalao told a meeting of 
district chiefs in May this year that Jakarta had 
authorised another 290 development projects worth about 
$22 million, but a few months earlier he had complained 
that only a quarter of the development expenditure 
budgetted for 1983/84 had been spent. There were even 
projects from the year before that that had not yet been 
implemented; some of them had been simply abandoned. 
(Sinor Haparan 19 July) 
The development projects being sponsored by Jakarta 
have given contractors and sub-contractors a field-day. 
The building fever has led to rampant land speculation in 
and around Dili. It was reported in July this year that 
government officials are buying up land from local 
peasants for the construction of luxury homes for Dili 's 
new elite of bureaucrats. Pejabats (Indonesian officials) 
are acquiring land at $3.5 per square meter, a fraction 
of land prices in Java. Things have become so bad that 
Carrascalao has complained of widespread corruption and 
the harmful effects of this land speculation. 
The appearance of Dili has inevitably undergone a 
drastic transformation. An East Timorese who has been 
away from of Timor for some years was struck during a 
recent visit to see how Dili has lost its Timorese 
character and has become a Javanese town. 
Agriculture 
According to Indonesia's fourth Five-Year Plan (1984-
1989), food production, plantation crops, animal-
husbandry and fisheries are the main areas of 'growth' in 
East Timor. Jakarta claims that a 'food surplus' has 
already been achieved in the districts of Ainaro, 
Bobonaro, Koval ima, Baucau, Manatuto and Liquica. 
Rice production has gone up from 16,521 tons in 1979 to 
33,572 tons in 1984. This is clearly the result of 
foreign aid programmes which are financing irrigation 
projects in certain parts of the country like the 10,000 
hectare project in the district of Bobonaro. But these 
'achievements' are irrelevant to the vast majority of 
Timorese peasants stashed away in heavily-controlled 
pemukimans. Nothing has been done to restore East 
Timorese agriculture which has been wrecked by the 
catastrophic population upheavals that followed in the 
wake of the Indonesian occupation and the countrywide 
bombing campaign in the late 1970s. 
The authorities show nothing but contempt for East 
Timor's 'backward' farmers and constantly emphasise that 
the rise in ric,e production is the result of 'the 
increase in the farming skills of the people' made 
possible by the influx of 'model' farmers from Bali. 
These Balinese farmers, brought over in the course of 
transmigration programnes implemented since 1982, have 
been placed in several new villages together with East 
Timorese villagers, known in Indonesia's developmentalist 
jargon as 'translocals', people who were uprooted from 
their own villages. 
The myth of these 'model' farmers was shattered by a 
recent report in the Indonesian press that young Balinese 
transmigrants had told journalists they were not farmers 
at all but senior high school graduates who had gone to 
East Tirnor under the irnpression that they would get jobs 
as businessmen or civil servants. (Indonesia Reports, 
September 1985, quoting Sinor Harapan, 28, August) 
It is clear that pembangunan in East Timor is producing 
rwo quire d1stincr types of new pemukiman or settlements. 
There are the settlements where the vast majority of the 
population live, under tight control of the military and 
constantly restricted in their movements. These villagers 
have been completely sidetracked by Indonesian-style 
development. But there are also a small number of 
settlements being set up in conjunction with new 
irrigated-rice projects and plantation sites which are 
getting a great deal of attention and capital investment 
from local and central government. These are known as 
desa potensial or 'villages of potential'. 
These 'model' Balinese farmers, photographed in May this 
year, turn out not to have been farmers at all. The 
Balinese governor seeing them off can't have been unaware 
of that! (..1alca.rta Post, 13 May) 
Two of these 'desa potensial' are 1 unubibi in Bobonaro 
district and Beco in Kovalima district both of which ore 
frequently spotlighted in the Indonesian press. They are 
the pet projects of Ors Basuki Adisukmo, head of the 
provincial office (Kanwil) of the Department of 
Transmigration in East Timar. Tunubibi was founded in 
1982 and has a population of 50 Balinese families and 50 
'tronslocols'. As a result of considerable government 
investment, Tunibibi is now using solar ,energy for its 
electricity and fresh-water supplies; it also hos 
equipment for producing bio-gas and a whole range of 
other hi-tech foci Ii ties. During a visit to Beco earlier 
this year, Ors Basuki Adikusma said that the village was 
inhabited by 169 'tronslocal' families. In May, 37 
Balinese ('model farmer'?) families were brought in and 
later, another 66 families were transported from Bali. 
Indonesian-style development requires that a Balinese 
family must live alongside each 'translocated' Timorese 
family. 
At present it is impossible to know how many of these 
'desa potensiol' have been set up but their creation is 
clearly part of a major project to obliterate Timorese 
village life-styles once and for all, while at the same 
time transforming agriculture in East Timor to make it 
serve a cash-crop-based market economy. It is a system 
which enables Jakarta to control a potentially huge 
agricultural surplus while leaving the vast majority of 
Timorese to wither away in concentration camps with 
little land to cultivate and subjected to security 
regulation.5 limiting their agricultural pursuits. These 
pemukimans are kept strictly out of the view of visiting 
diplomats and journalists. 
Ir Hadiono, the .Jovanese head of the East Timar office 
of the Department of Agriculture, recently gave foreign 
journalists a glowing picture of the direction being 
taken by Indonesian plans for East Timor's agriculture. 
He told them that one day, East Timor's 14,600 square 
kilometers will be transformed into a neatly and 
carefully organised "cottage garden" with 15% of the land 
given over to producing vegetables, 9% set aside for 
pasturing, 10% for tree-crop plantations, 24% comnercial 
forests, l 0% for irrigated-rice production and the 
remainder for non-agricultural uses. That's all very neat 
and tidy, but Ir Hadiono was silent on how the Timorese 
population would fit in with these plans and it seems 
that the journalists didn't question him on this aspect 
of the plan, either. 
Because of the highly controlled nature of press 
reporting about East Timor, virtually nothing has seeped 
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through about the economic posit ion of Timorese peasants 
who have been incorporated into the rice projects. But 
For Eastern Economic Review journalist, Lincoln Kaye 
provided a brief insight into the plight of Timorese 
growers of the country's main cash crop, coffee. In the 
first place, he discovered that PT Denok, the militar'y-
backed trading monopoly that was set up imnediately after 
the Indonesian invasion in 1975 has not, as some reports 
claim, disappeared from the scene. It has simply been 
transformed into a company with a new name, PT Batara 
Indra whose directors are the same Java-based Chinese 
known to have managed PT Denok. In fact, Batara Indra is 
still popularly known in East Timar as 'PT Denok' and 
continues to exercise a monopoly over the purchase of 
coffee and other cash crops. 
Although the amount of land now being used for coffee 
production has, according to Ir Hadiono, increased by 
44,560 hectares, production has not increased. 
Carrascalao blames the fall in yield per hectare on the 
aging bushes and the lagging rejuvenation prograrrme, but 
a retired coffee-grower interviewed by Lincoln Kaye 
blamed 'Denok' for "all the unpicked beans you see 
rotting on the bushes in the coffee regions. Back in 
Portuguese times, you could buy four packs of cigarettes 
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for what a kilo of coffee earned you. Nowadays, you could 
just about buy one pack." (Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 
August l 985) 
Nearly 22,000 orphans in East Timor 
There are no fewer than 21,833 orphans in East Timor, 
according to Nawawi Jufri, an Indonesian 
parliamentarian, following a visit to the region 
earlier this year. (Suara Karya, 27 April) He also 
discovered that there were 7,900 cripples, 11,231 
homeless children, 17,403 elderly people without 
sustenance, 13,701 uncared-for widows, and a further 
2,800 people bereft of social care (tuna sosial). 
According to these figures, there ore altogether 
74,868 people [nearly 15% of the population of just 
over 500,000] "in need of social support" (penyandang 
masalah sosial) which, as far as one can make out 
from this statement, is simply not available. 
He also said that 20% of the population of East 
Timor are living in isolated mountainous areas and ' 
that 6CJ% of the territory of East Timor is 
inaccessible by available mean.s of transport. Could 
he be referring to areas of the country that are 
beyond the control of the Indonesian forces of 
occupation? 
Thi~ travel pass fran Boucau to Dili, a distance of about 80 kilometres, had to be st~ on the way at 16 Tt d 
pohce posts. mi 1 ary on 
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Alexander George, East Tim or and the 
Shaming of the West. foreword by Lord 
Avebury. TAPOL, London, 1985. 
Ten years of brutal warfare, with 
aerial bombardment, the resettling of 
the population in concentration camps 
and widespread violation of hum an 
rights, has resulted in the death of 
at least a quarter of the population. 
In one of the most impressive 
liberation struggles in recent years, 
fretilin continues to fight 
Indonesia's occupation with the 
support of an indigenous population 
outraged by Indonesian brutality. 
To commemorate the l 0th anniversary 
of the invasion, TAPOL has published 
a short text by Alexander George 
documenting the war, outlining press 
coverage and charting the 
responsibilities of the governments 
of industrialised countries for 
Indonesian occupation and annexation. 
In a style similar to that of 
Chomsky in his East Ti•or and the 
Western Democracies, George focusses 
on the policies of the British 
government, contrasting private 
policies and public statements during 
the IO-year period. To give a flavour 
of the text, there is the case of 
David 0 wen who, as foreign Secretary 
in 1978, argued that the Labour 
Government "played a leading part in 
efforts to reach an internationally 
acceptable settlement in East Tim or". 
Two months earlier, 0 wen's peace-
seeking government had underwritten 
the sale of eight Hawk ground-attack 
aircraft which were soon to play a 
role strengthening the combattive 
capability of the Indonesian Air 
force which was bombing East Timor. 
l recall a conversation at the time 
with a relatively young defence 
expert protege MP, Robin Cook who 
assured me these were only "trainer 
versions" of the plane, and would be 
used solely for this purpose. He had 
been assured by the company building 
the plan es, British A erosp ace... A 
selective reader, Cook had quietly 
ignored, For public consumption, the 
Aerospace booklets which stressed 
that the Hawk offered "full ground 
attack capability. 
I cite this example because the 
1975-79 Labour Govern menthas much lo 
answer For. It did nothing to 
publicise the Facts of Indonesian 
brutality, of which it was well aw are 
as it had access to detailed reports 
provided by Australian intelligence. 
There are more examples to add to the 
cases presented by George. In October 
1975, two British citizens were 
killed by Indonesian troops in East 
Tim or. The British government knew 
this very soon afterwards yet did 
nothing to investigate the murders. 
Despite this and the widespread 
starvation following the 1978 
bombings, the Labour Government 
refused to press Jakarta to admit the 
International Red Cross (ICRC). There 
are many other cases. The contrast 
between private and public utterances 
is stark, and even more so with the 
present Tory Government though at 
least it asked Suharto to extend IC RC 
activities in East Tim.or, even if it 
has done little else. 
In looking at the responsibility of 
the West, we also have to look at the 
form er colonial pow er, Portugal. 
Since there is little on this in 
George's book, it is worth noting a 
Few points. Had the Portuguese 
adopted a firmer policy towards 
Indonesia before the invasion, it 
could have been delayed or even 
prevented. Yet, at crucial mom en ts, 
they acquiesced in Indonesian action. 
They publicly stressed a commitment 
to East Timor yet privately agreed to 
the Indonesian takeover. for example, 
Almeida Santos, now a leading member 
of the Socialist Party, declared 
wholehearted support for the East 
Timorese on a tour in October 1975. 
He stated he had found something of 
which he had previously been unaware, 
a "love for Portugal" in East Timor. 
So concerned was he to honour this 
love that he stopped over in Jakarta 
and Sydney on his way back to Lisbon 
to discuss the results of his secret 
meeting with Ali M urtopo prior to his 
East Timor trip - to build on Prime 
Minister Goncalves' view that 
independence for East Timor was 
"nonsense". 
The years 1974-75 are replete with 
such cases. Portugal's responsibility 
for the ensuing events is direct. The 
colonial power did nothing about the 
genocide of the population For whom, 
legally, it remained responsible. At 
this very moment, it is discussing 
with Indonesia such pressing issues 
as m aintairiing a Portuguese heritage 
in East Ti mor. In October and 
November 197 5, when Indonesian troops 
were crossing the East Tim or border, 
Portuguese Governor Lemos Pires, sent 
many cables to Lisbon requesting 
assitance, advice and making 
important suggestions such as getting 
the UN to incorporate East Tim or as 11 
Trust Territory. He received no 
replies whatsoever. This silence 
symbolises Portugal ' s response - and 
its responsibility. 
John Taylor 
Klemens Ludwig and Korinna Horta, 
Osttimor, Das Vergessene Sterben: 
Indonesische Volkerm ord unter 
A usschluss der Offenllichkeit (East 
Tim or, forgotten Deaths: Indonesian 
Genocide Hidden from the Public), 
June 1985, Program Taschenbucher 
1013, Gesellschaft fur bedrohte 
Volker, Gottingen, Germany. 
The publisher of this book is the 
only organisation in the German-
speaking world that defends the 
rights of ethnic and religious 
minorities. It campaigns against 
genocide and ethnocide and, like 
Amnesty International, is politically 
neutral. It is in this context that 
this book should be read and 
understood. The first thing that 
catches the eye is the many co-
publisher Christian organisations, 
with a foreword by father Franz 
Kam p h us, Bishop of Li m burg and 
chairmanoftheGerm-an Commission for 
Justice and Peace. 
It gives a comprehensive account of 
the plight of the East Timorese, 
their colonial history, the history 
of Indonesia's brutal occupation and 
the international diplomatic effort, 
with a chapter on efforts at the UN. 
It also discusses the role of the 
federal German Republic, the 
solidarity of the Catholic Church and 
slowly evolving support from other 
churches. 
There is a useful appendix and a 
chronology going back to 152 0. A 
collection of letters and documents 
provides a vivid picture of the 
tragic conditions of the Timorese 
people under Indonesian occupation. 
There is a worldwide survey of press 
reports and an bibliography on the 
Timar issue. It is readable, 
informative and well researched and 
of special interest to German readers 
for the detail it provides about the 
FDR's economic involvement with 
Indonesia, its political stance, and 
a criticism of the 'Roeder press', 
Roeder being a journalist from Munich 
whose reports about East Timor have 
been a major source of pro-Indonesian 
reporting for media in many parts of 
the world. (Roeder wrote The Smiling 
General, a very flattering biography 
of Suharto, Indonesia ' s president.J 
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All this plus the autho rs ' s trict 
neutralit y and the many Chr i st i an 
organisations expressing solidarity 
makes this a work of interest to a 
broad spectrum of readers. So me no 
doubt will be disappointed by the 
lack of deep political analysis, but 
there is enough information for 
everyone to draw their own 
conclusions. 
It is important to have a book on 
East Timor in German, in fact, the 
first one written about East Tirnor. 
Let us hope it will help break down 
the wall of silence that surrounds 
East Timor despite the international 
solidarity expressed since 197 5. 
Dorothea Savage 
Books also received: 
Robert Mitton, The lost World of 
Irisn Jay a, published by Oxford 
University Press Melbourne, 1984. 
UK price £28.50. 
finngeir fliorth, Ti•or - Past and 
Present, South East Asian Monograph 
No 17, James Cook University, 
Townsville, Queensland. A$8.00. 
We hope to publish reviews in the 
next issue. 
* * * * * 
N DTE: 
Part IV of our series on "The Re-
organisation of A BRI" has been held 
over till the next issue. 
* * * * * 
~4s s~""t~ ,-,..,~ 
~,,,,;,;_ oli' 
Of tJ,, 
e ..,e.st 
Alexander George 
foreword by Lord Avebury 
a 1/i;id publication 
This new TAP UL publication is 
available for £1.20 including postage 
(£2.00 airmail). 
TAP O L plans several new publications 
in 1986, and will also be producing 
Occasional Reports on a variety of 
subject&. 
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There is no military government in Indonesia 
By TA POL 's special correspondent in .Jakarta 
There is no military government in Indonesia. Who else 
could say such a thing if not General Amir Machmud, 
chairman of Indonesia's two legislative bodies, the Dffi 
and the MPR? At a meeting with nine newly appointed 
Indonesian ambassadors, he said: "There is no military 
government in Indonesia. The world should be told that 
besides theocratic, liberal and socialist systems, there 
is another, the Pancasila system." And he said: "The PKI 
leaders were executed in compliance with legal 
procedures." 
Amir Machmud was replying indirectly to the many 
denunciations by the European Parliament made since June 
this year. The mlli tary regime in Indonesia is trying 
desperately to extricate itself from the corner into 
which it was driven by the European Parliament resolution 
denouncing the Indonesian government for its barbarity 
and its total lack of humanitarianism. This was a serious 
moral condemnation yet it was not the moral question that 
had the Suharto government worried, but rather the fear 
of economic sanctions. They fear that these denunciations 
by the European Parliament could affect the amount of 
credit and investment being received by Indonesia. 
Why does Amir Machmud constantly let off steam like 
this? It's a case of over-compensation and there are two 
possible explanations. Either he's a PKI traitor or a CIA 
agent. Now it's no secret that he joined the PKI in 1947 
in Cirebon and was sworn in by Tjimung, then district 
head of Cirebon, and Djoko Sudjono. When he was Military 
Commander of East Kalimantan, his contact with the PKI 
Central Committee was Sofyan, leader of the PKI East 
Kalimantan Provincial Committee. 
During the critical period in late 1965, Amir Machmud 
was recalled to Jakarta to replace Umar Wirahadikusumah 
as Jakarta Military Commander, an appointment suppor.ted 
by the PKI. It was PKI leader Tjugito who proposed the 
Amir appointment to Dr Subandrio, then still First Deputy 
Prime Minister, and the proposal was accepted by 
President Sukarno. Amir Machmud was regarded as a 
'progressive-revolutionary' general. Either his PKI 
membership was a hoax or he was a genuine CIA agent. No-
one should therefore be surprised at his over-acting, 
which is typical for an opportunist. 
When he first became Jakarta Military Commander, there 
were banners in Banteng Square, headquarters of the 
Jakarta Military Command, proclaiming: 'Long live 
Sukarno, the Armed Forces and the People!" and "Long live 
the Great Leader of the Revolution!" But now? 
Is there or is there not a military government in 
Indonesia? Maybe not in name but that's what it is, one 
hundred percent, whatever the wrappings. We only hope 
that the European Par! iament will follow through its 
resolution consistently. 
The dwi-fungsi {dual function) of the Armed Forces 
means that everyone from president down to lurch \village 
head} must be military. Everyone running the top 
legislative bodies, the judiciary and the state 
enterprises must be an active or retired general. Was it 
not General Sayidiman Suryodiprodjo who said: military 
cadres are the only ones corrmitted to and acceptable to 
the people; such leadership qualities do not yet exist 
among civilians? Is this not blunt recognition that 
military cadres are the only ones who govern and who are 
capable of governing? 
Take for instance the recent appointment of the 
governor of Rieu. The man elected by the regional 
assembly was Ismail Suko, a civilian member of Golkar, 
but he was forced to withdraw. Major-General Iman 
Munandar, the present governor who had lost the 
assembly's support, was re-appointed instead. So, who 
'holds the reins of power, the people or the army? Need we 
say more? 
Or take the bloody Tanjung Priok incident. There is no 
such thing as martial law in Indonesia yet the police 
were kept out of the affair; the army was brought in to 
murder an assembled crowd of people. There is not one 
shred of evidence that anyone in the crowd was armed, no 
proof that people in Tanjung Priok were planning a revolt 
which might have been cause for the Army to mow down 
hundreds of souls without process. So what kind of 
government it this? 
Or take yet another blatant example of militarism under 
the Suharto government. At a Golkar meeting in Tangerang, 
West Java on 30 September, attended by many top-level 
officials such as General Alamsyah, Minister-Coordinator 
for Social Affairs, the Governor of West Java and the 
chairman of the West Java Golkar provincial committee, 
Lieutenant-Colonei Tadju Sobirin who is the district head 
of Tangerang handed a knife to General Yogie S. Memet, 
governor of West Java province, saying: ''Use this knife 
to slit my throat if Golkar loses 
the ( 1987} general election. And 
if this should happen, I will 
first slit the throats of the 
chairman of Tangerang Golkar and 
all the sub-district and village 
heads!" Tadju Sobirin also handed 
the chairman of Golkar West Java 
branch a whip used to flay beasts 
of burden. {Behind all the 
his tr ionics is the fact that in 
the past three elections, Golkar 
votes in Tangerang have fallen 
steadily against a rise in the 
Muslim vote.) 
Notwithstanding all the evidence 
that Indonesia is governed by the 
military, they still try to deny 
it. The general election, 
proclaimed ad nauseum as a 'feast 
of democracy', is being launched 
with weapons of death and 
torture, reeking with blood. 
British Rapier missiles, supplied under a contract signed last year with British 
Aerospace, were on show in Ja<arta on Armed Forces Day, 5 October. 
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Anti-communist witch-hunt, 1985 
The military regime is currentJ.y engaged in a campaign to whip up hysteria against former members or sympathisers of the 
banned Communist Party (PK!). The campaign is directed not only against former political prisoners but against alleged 
members or sympathisers of the many mass organisations banned when the military took. power in 1965. Moreover, it is being 
directed increasingly against the offspring and relatives of these alleged members and sympathisers. At a time when there 
are signs of growing social unrest, the regime is using the 'GJOS/PKI' symbol ) to intimidate the forces of social and 
political opposition. 
In the lasr issue of TAPa... Bulletin, we pointed out 
that the re-registration of ex-tapols (political 
prisoners) to determine their right to vote in the 
general elect ions to be held in April 1987 is just an 
excuse to tighten up control of ex-tapols. As the 
operation proceeds, it is clear that anyone remotely 
connected with the PKI is likely to become a target of 
the current hysteria. The following reports are only a 
selection of news i terns that have appeared in the 
national and regional press in the past two months. 
Interior Ministry directs the ccmpaign 
In October, the Department of the Interior convened a 
Coordination Meeting of the heads of all the Department's 
provincial directorates of social and political affairs 
to "examine and assess as well as guide and supervise the 
G30S/PKI".( Sinor t-lorapan, 9 October) Major-General 
(retired) Hori Soegiman, the Department's head of Social 
and Political Affairs, who was previously a senior 
official ofKopkamtib, the Army's Operational Command for 
the Restoration of Security and Order, warned the meeting 
that so far, only 1.7 million 'followers of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)' had as yet been re-
registered, whereas the PKI chairman, D.N. Aidit claimed 
at the beginning of 1965 that the PKI had a following of 
20 million. 
The Election Law as amended earlier this year gives the 
government absolute powers to examine and assess the 
voting rights of all former members of the PKI and its 
mass organisations, as well as anyone 'directly or 
indirectly involved ' in the G30S/PKI, said Major-General 
Soegiman. Collection of data concerning these people is 
complicated by the fact that since 1979, former political 
prisoners hove returned to society, while many have moved 
home without the proper administrative procedures. 
''There must be meticulous and selective examination of 
the right to vote of each and every one of them," he 
said. As for the task of 'guidance and supervision', this 
rests primarily with government officials at the lowest 
level of administration, the lurahs and village heads and 
their residential units, known as the RT and RW. 
Jogjacarta has 'lost' 2,833 ex-tapols 
According to press reports, the 1985 re-registration of 
ex-tapols in Jogjakarta, Central Java has been far from 
satisfactory, because the authorities complain that they 
have 'lost' no fewer than 2,833 of the 43, 118 who were 
registered in 1982. 
Following this alarming discovery, Sugeng Kadaroesman, 
the local head of Social and Political Affairs announced 
that he had made contact with his counterparts throughout 
the country to check the whereabouts of these people. "If 
they're dead, we must know where their graves are; if 
they have moved, we must know where to." (Sinor t-lorapan, 
26 September) 
Stressing that PKI people "never abandon their 
ideology", Kadaroesman said they operate a system of 
"organisation without form" and "four changes" - change 
of name, change of address, change of profession and 
change of appearance. Moreover, we in Jogjakarta have 
been "caught napping" (kecolongan), complained 
Kadaroesman, because "people with ties to former G30S/PKI 
prisoners" have participated in local elections and hove 
even been elected onto village administrations in five 
places, four in the district of Sleman and one in the 
district of Kulonprogo. 
N.H. Soedirdjo, a retired lieutenant-colonel and former 
chairman of the Jogjakarta Assembly added his voice to 
the hysteria, proclaiming that oil 'ex-PKiers ' who still 
hold jobs in village administration, in the civil service 
or as teachers must be "pensioned of P'. (Sinor t-loropan, 1 
October) This gentleman asserts his right to speak 
because he ployed a leading part, as a captain in a 
Kostrad infantry brigade, in "wiping out" the PK! in the 
district of Kulonprogo in late 1965 and had many 
"frightful" experiences at the time. [Jogjakarta was an 
area of particularly ferocious killings during the late-
1965 massacres.] 
Lieutenant-Colonel (Infantry) Anotono Margo of the 
Jogjakarta Military Command is also upset about the 
'lost' ex-tapols and said their families were being 
"checked out" to find out where they had gone. He said 
that there were altogether more than 300,000 'exPKlers' 
in Jogjakarta and it was not yet certain how many of them 
would be allowed to vote. (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 5 October) 
US oil company sacks pre-1965 
trade unionists 
The major US oil company Coltex was among several oil 
companies which sacked hundreds of employees in November 
on orders of Kopkamtib because they had been members of 
the oil-workers union, Perbum before it was banned in 
1965. Altogether 1,638 oil-workers were dismissed, 637 by 
Caltex which operates in Riau, 962 by the state oil 
company Pertamina and another 39 by the Tesoro Indonesia 
Petroleum Company which operates in Kalimantan. 
Announcing these dismissals, Pertamina said the fired 
workers would be prevented from getting jobs in all oil 
companies operating joint ventures with Pertamina. It is 
being suggested in Indonesia that this politically-
inspired vindictive move is being taken partly to conceal 
economic retrenchment at a time of contracting markets 
for I ndones ion petroleum and widespread redundancies 
throughout the economy. 
A spokesman claimed that the 'PKI background' of the 
people in question had been known since 1965 but they 
were not dismissed earlier because they held "highly-
skilled jobs" and could not have been dismissed without 
causing disruption. (Jakarta Post, 7 December) However, 
the same paper had reported a day earlier that according 
to Sinor t-bropon, most of the sacked Caltex workers were 
"low-category workers of the company's transportation and 
warehousing departments," so that the mass dismissals 
would not affect company operations. 
Admiral Sudomo, now Labour Minister who was commander 
of the security agency, Kopkamtib until 1983, has 
explained that these dismissals have been planned for a 
long time, since before he took on his present job. The 
dismissals are based on Kopkamtib Regulation No 28 passed 
while he was still at Kopkamtib, regarding dismissals of 
'members of banned PKI organisations'. Would others 
follow, he was asked. All enterprises would have to 
resolve this 'G30$/PKI' problem, he said ominously (Sinor 
t-loropafl 6 November), while Merdeko quotes him as saying 
as many as 6,000 could be affected in the oil sector 
alone. 
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The witch-hunting Kopkamtib C'egulation 
Kopkamtib Regulation No 28 was issued in 1975 and dealt 
specifically with 'Category C' suspects. In the late 
1960s and 1970s when hundreds of thousands of PKI 
suspects were in detention, 'Category A' referred to a 
relative small number awaiting trial, 'Category B' to 
tens of thousands who could not be tried 'for lack of 
evidence' and were to be detained indefinitely, and 
'Category C' to an even greater number who were eligible 
for release, though this did not mean that they ceased to 
be suspects. 'Category C' was also used for 'PKI 
suspects' who were never arrested but who nevertheless 
were the subject of Kopkamtib control. 
Regulation No 28 sub-divided 'Category C' people into 
Cl for those 'involved in the Madiun Affair' (of 1948), 
C2 for 'ordinary members of PKI-oriented mass 
organisations' and C3 for 'PKI sympathisers'. The 
Regulation required all C 1 people to be dishonorably 
dismissed from jobs in the state sector or other 'vital 
sectors'. C2 and C3 people could be kept on, but should 
be placed under surveillance and 'given guidance'. But it 
was understood that in due course, C2 and C3 people would 
also be appropriately 'dealt with'. . 
According to Labour Minister Sudomo, the recent oil 
sector mass dismissals are directed against these C2 and 
C3 employees. (Tempo, 16 November) . 
This shows how, after so many years, people are being 
hounded for blatantly political reasons with not the 
slightest chance of defending themselves against 
arbitrary dismissal. 
Elected village-head discovered to be on 'ex-PKI Muso' 
man's son 
A person elected village-head in a village in the 
district of Nganjuk, East Java was discovered, after the 
election, to be the son of an 'ex-A<J Muso' member and 
his installation could not therefore take place. [Muso 
was the leader of the PKI for a brief period nearly 40 
years ago, in 1948.] Reporting the strenuous efforts of 
l.ocal army officers to prevent the man from assuming his 
post, Surabaya Post (5 October) points out that a 
decision issued by the governor of East Java in 1983 
stipulates that anyone whose natural father or mother 
were directly involved in the 'GJOS/PKI' is prohibited 
from being a candidate in village elections. 
(Published in Kompos, 22 October.) While the two non-government officially-sponsored parties have been forced to divest 
themselves of their political identity, Golkar has declared that its target for the 1987 elections is 61,391,869 votes. 
Transmigration 
closed to "ex-PKI" 
Acting on orders from the President, the Minister for 
Transmigration, Martone had announced that 'ex-PKI 
people' will no longer be allowed to participate in the 
transmigration prograrrme. The Minister said that 426,498 
'ex-PKI' family-heads with family members totalling in 
all 1,759,492 have already been transmigrated to ,sites 
spread over twenty provinces. The figure seems to be 
preposterously high; nor is it likely that the Department 
would have such precise figures. It sounds more likely 
that the Minister has pulled figures out of a hat just to 
emphasise that the 'corrmunist threat' now endangers aH 
parts of the country, not only Java where PKI strength 
was concentrated before 1965. 
For those who were transmigrated before the ban was 
imposed, said Martono, the President has given Hegional 
Mili tory Corrrnanders powers to introduce a system of 
'continual guidance'. 
Officials in Lampung, till recently a major target-area 
for transmigration, have also announced that surveillance 
of 'ex-PKI transmigrants' has been intensified because 
some of them have 'disappeared' from their settlements, 
while in parts of South Sumatra, others have 'slipped in' 
without permission. The military corrrnander of South 
Sumatra, Major-General Siswadi said that one of them had 
even got himself appointed village-head though he had now 
(thankfully!) been dismissed. Siswadi claims that there 
are 60,000 [note how precision has given way to a round 
figure] 'ex-PKI' family-heads among the transmigrants in 
Lampung. (Kompas, 5 October) 
Trasmigration Minister rejects foreign criticism 
At the same time as announcing the ban on 'ex-PKI' 
transmigrants, the Minister for Transmigration also 
responded angrily to criticism from abroad coming, he 
said, mainly from Scandinavian countries, that 
transmigration is a violation of human rights. Some 
people are trying to influence world opinion by 
condemning the programne for destroying the environment 
by cutting down forests and denuding the mountarns. They 
hope to convince foreign countries to stop supporting the 
prograrrme, he complained. 
Meanwhile, we have learned that Bas Suebu, chairman of 
the Irion Joya Provincial Assembly, has been sent on a 
mission to London, The Hague and possibly other European 
capitals to beef up IGGI support for the transmigration 
prograrrme. 
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MILITARY PROFILES 
Jakarta's new military commander 
fresh from Timor 
Fresh from East Timor where he served as corrmander of an 
operational corrmand for the restoration of security, 
Brigadier -General (now Major-General) Sugito, 46 years 
old, was installed as comnander of the Jakarta Military 
Corrrnand (Kodam Jaya) on 9 August. 
Sugito graduated from the Military Academy in 1961 and 
has spent almost all his army career since then in the 
elite para-corrmando corps known first as RA<AD, then as 
Kopassandha and now as Kopassus. This is the first time 
the Jakarta Military Comnand has been placed under a 
para- corrmando officer. 
Sugito has a reputation as a 'fighting' officer, a man 
who has always token on so-called 'tough' assig/'Vllents. He 
was among the first RA<AD troops to be parachuted into 
East Timor at the time of the Indonesian invasion in 
December 1975. (Terrpo, 17 August 1985) 
The biographical details so far made available in the 
Indonesian press about Jakarta's new corrmander are 
unusually sketchy. In fact, the public heard little about 
him until this latest appointment, although in Armed 
Forces circles, he is regarded as a highly proficient 
officer and a swift decision maker. 
All that is known of his career apart from his RA<AD 
background is that from 1978 to 1982, he was military 
attache in Hanoi and after returning from that post, he 
spent a year at the National Defence Institute 
(Lemhanas}. Since then, he has occupied two corrrnand 
positions concurrently: as comnander of the Air Defence 
Fighting Corrmand {Kopur Linud) and as corrmander of the 
Operational Corrmand for the Restoration of Security in 
East Timer. 
The existence of this latter Corrmand has not, to our 
knowledge, been mentioned previously. The East Timor 
operational command, superimposed on the regular 
territorial corrmand structure, was created in late 1983 
at a time when General Murdani was clearly frustrated at 
the lacklustre results of his August 1983 offensive. 
Little has been revealed in the press about the tasks and 
achievements of the new East Timor command under Brig-
General Sugi to except that he brought about "many 
improvements" according to Tempo. As if to convince the 
public that Indonesian military comnanders actually enjoy 
some popularity among the people of that occupied 
territory, Tempo claimed that his departure from East 
Timor would be "a heavy blow to some of the population". 
In the words of Sinor Harapan (1 October) Sugito had 
given a "sense of security to his troops". 
Sugito is said to take a fourfold approach to his 
operational duties: persuasive-educative, preventive, 
limited repressive and total repressive. This, according 
jo - rol Sugito1 centr~ with General ~dini, A!!!_ll 
Chief-of-Stoff, left, and ex Jd<orto conmon<fer, Miijor-
Generol Try Sutrisno, now Deputy Army Chief-of-Stoff. 
to comnentators, makes him luwes (flexible). When 
interviewea by Journalists about his new post, he said he 
would adopt the same "flexible" approach as in East 
Timor. A major operational duty in Jakarta would be to 
safeguard security at all the subversion trials now under 
way in the capital which "are being flooded by masses of 
people who are sometimes unable to control themselves". 
{Sinar Harapan, 21 August) 
Sugito is regarded as a Murdani stalwart used for the 
past two years to assume control of operations in East 
Timor and now expected to keep control of the country's 
capital in the face of expected 'riots and subversion'. 
Whoever replaces him in East Timor wi 11 doubtless make 
little difference to the people there, but it is clear 
that Jakarta has gained a vicious, dedicated and tough 
corrmander. 
ABRl's two new infantry divisions 
A major objective of the current re-organisation of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces (AERI) is shortening lines of 
comnand and providing the regime with a far more 
effective, centrally-controlled strike force. This is 
being achieved by reinforcing the Army's Strategic 
Reserve Comnand, Kastrad, the prestigious corps which 
Suharto used as his base tor taking power in 1965. 
In October this year, two new infantry divisions were 
installed under the corrmand of Kostrad: Infantry Division 
I and Infantry Division 11. They have taken over the 
functions and personnel of two battle corrmands, the Air 
Defence Corrmand {kopur Li nud) and the I Ind Battle Corrmond 
(Kopur 11) which were liquidated to make way for the new 
divisions. General Rudini, Army Chief-of-Staff, declared 
that both infantry divisions would have the full 
complement of forces at their disposal including cavalry 
(tanks), field artillery, air-defence artillery, plus 
their own sea and air power including a marine unit each, 
LST craft ar.d Hercules C-130 troop-carrier aircraft. In 
other words, they will both operate "at full capacity". 
(Sinor Harapon, 3 October) 
Infantry Colonel Warsito and Infantry Colonel Muslim 
Masewa have been appointed respectively co1TITIC1nders of 
Infantry Divisions I and II. They are both 1961 graduates 
of the national Military Academy. 
The ''bitter pill" of East Timor 
The Sinar Harapan defence correspondent, Atmadji, 
explains that, up to now, infantry divisions attached to 
the territorial divisions have been far from effective, 
mustering little more than a few companies and never 
achieving battalion strength. In view of this and the 
Army's "bitter pill" (sic} in East Timor, he writes, all 
infantry brigades attached to the territorial corrmands 
have been liquidated and transferred to Kostrad's two new 
infantry divisions. 
The ten territorial divisions will continue to be 
responsible for maintaining security in their respective 
regions but the two Kostrad divisions, functioning as a 
rapid deployment force, will be on call for operations 
throughout the country. Military spokesmen make it clear 
that these infantry divisions are needed primarily for 
operations against 'internal subversion' because the 
regime does not consider Indonesia to be under threat of 
external attack from any quarter. In the words of General 
Rudini, Infantry Divisions I and II must "safeguard 
(Indonesia's) territorial integrity and protect social 
and political stability from all forms of unrest, 
disturbances and threats, particularly security 
disturbances from within the country". { Andcotan 
Bersenjoto, 10 August) 
Western powers who are busily competing for orders to 
equip ABRI's rapid deployment force should note that 
these arms supplies will only strengthen the regime 
against internal political unrest and the liberation 
struggles in East Timor and West Papua, for these are the 
clearly defined targets of ABRI's revamped strike force. 
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A clean-up for Suharto's image 
Every ljea.r, when 1 Oct:Dber comes round, the Indonesian public is treated t:D a heavy dose of anti-communist propaganda as 
a reminder, in case an1Jone has forgotten, that the Suharto regime holds the Indonesian Communist Party (Pl<.1) responsible 
for masterminding an attempted coup on 1 Oct:Dber 1965, the day on which Suharto took control of the Armed Forces as the 
first step in his own seizure of state power. 1985 being the 20th anniversary, the dose this year was heavier than usual. 
But there was a special edge to it as well, that of polishing up Suharto's bloodthirsty image. 
A major topic in the press this year was the murder of 
D.N. Aidit, chairman of the A<I who, as is already known 
fran earlier 1 October-related articles, was shot down in 
cold blood on 22 November 1965 by Colonel Yosir 
Hodibroto, corrrnonder of the Fourth Infantry Brigade of 
Kos trod, the Army Strategic Command whose commander was 
Major-General, now General(ret'd)/President Suharto. 
Colonel Yosir who is now a major-general and governor of 
the province of Lampung, hos given a public account of 
the murder of Ai di t no fewer than three times s i nee 19 80 
but each time, crucial aspects of the story have changed. 
The most important 'modification' relates to the role 
of Suharto in instructing Yasir to mu~der Aidit. In 
Yasir's first account, published in the Sunday edition of 
Kompos on 5 October, 1980 (for an unabridged translation, 
see TAPOLBulletin, No. 41 /42, September/November 1980), 
Yosir mckes no attempt to hide the fact that the order to 
kill the A<I chairman - to deal with him, was the 
expression used - came from Suharto. The account gives 
the clear impression that Yosir was acting under orders 
from Suharto and includes not the slightest hint that the 
decision to shoot his captive was in any way his own 
responsibility. 
The account he gave three years later (in the Sunday 
edition of Sinor Harapon, 2 October 1983) eliminates all 
reference to any order from Suharto except insofar as he 
was under Suharto's command to take his Kostrad troops to 
Central Java to 'restore order'. The decision to shoot 
Aidi t now appears as a personal decision, taken because 
Aidit vehemently protested at being handcuffed by a 
lieutenant while he was being driven to Semarang in an 
army vehicle with Yasir sitting in the front seat. 
Aidit's 'rebellious' attitude 'upset' Yasir (the 
Indonesian word used is pusing), 'forcing' him to stop 
the convoy and issue an order to shoot his captive. 
Aidit's body was 'left there' and Yasir proceeded to 
Semarang to report to the Central Java military command 
on what he had done. 
In this version, Yasir claims to hove been very worried 
that he could be charged and punished once Sukarno, then 
still Indonesia's president, discovered that Aidit, a 
minister-coordinator in Sukarno's government, had been 
bumped off. Emphasis on his own responsibility and his 
'sense of guilt' eliminates all impression that he 
committed the murder on Suharto's orders. 
The 1985 version 
Yasir's account Mark III got a far wider airing than 
the previous accounts and was published in at least four 
Jakarta dailies (Suora Koryo, Sinor Haropon and Berito 
Buono, 1 October, and Jacarta Post, 2 October, 1985) The 
element of personal responsibility and 'guilt' is even 
stronger. Aidit's 'rebelliousness' is now made to look 
far more provocative. The story this time is that Yasir 
had decided to take Aidit to Jakarta (presumably to meet 
- and be freed by? - President Sukarno) but became 
infuriated on the way to Semarang when Aidit started 
'yelling his head off' about an imminent 'communist 
...-ictory' in Indonesia. This time, Yasir presents his own 
react ion as being that, if this man is allowed to go 
free, 'Indonesia's history will be very different'. 
Thus provoked, he ordered the convoy to 1T1ake for the 
base of one of his battalions. On arriving there, he took 
Aidit out, stood him by a well and, after allowing him to 
'make a speech' for about ten minutes, shot him dead w ilh 
his Owen rifle, a weapon he had kept with him for the 
past 15 years. 'With this weapon, I didn't need to take 
aim. I just shot from the hip .•• and loor-loor." Aidit's 
body fell into the well and was covered up to conceal its 
presence. A few days later, Yasir returned to throw wood 
down the well and set fire to it. 
Yasir's account Mark-III is taken up in Suara Karya the 
following day (2 October) by Major-General (ret'd) 
Wahono, now governor of East Java, who was Suharto's 
Assistant for Operations at Kostrad in 1965. Describing 
himself as someone who was at Suharto's side night and 
day during those early critical months, Wahono asserts 
that the news that Aidit had been- shot dead 'caused 
consternation' (as if Suharto was taken completely by 
surprise by Aidi t's death). So Suharto ordered Wahono to 
prepare a report for Sukarno. "At all costs, Pak Harto 
should not be rebuked (over the affair) by Bung Karno," 
thought Wahono while preparing this report, qccording to 
1 ...... ...,. .,..,. """' 
........... 
7. lnm..,11.....,... 
"""'"'ny; ON Alcllt 
D.N. Aidit 
A diagram published by Sinaz H.uapan (2 October 
1983) claims that this is how Yaslr captured Aidit 
who was hiding in a cupboard. 
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Suara Karya. "What was so worrying was that Bung Karno 
had asked Pak Harto to bring Aidit who had fled to 
Central Java back to Jakarta." 
As soon as the report was ready, Suharto went to see 
the President while Wahono waited anxiously back at 
Kostrad HQ. Suharto returned from the Palace "looking 
somewhat gloomy" but said that nothing had happened. 
"Bung Karno only said, 'if he's already dead, what else 
is there to do?', said Suharto, as he untied his boots." 
Extra-judicial murder officially confirmed 
Aidit's cold-blooded murder by his Army captor occurred 
at a time when hundreds of thousands of people were being 
slain by or at the instigation of Suharto's troops in 
many parts of the country. It is symptomatic of the 
deathly silence surrounding these ghastly massacres that 
Aidit's murder is the only one to have been officially 
acknowledged by the Suharto regime. This murder was 
crucial to the future of Suharto's rule because, of all 
people, Aidit could have explained the extent and 
limitations of the PKI's support for the Army officers 
who launched the kidnap plot on 1 October 1965 which 
paved the way to Suharto's seizure of power. 
Yasir Hadibroto, now in his second term as governor of 
Lampung, was Aidit's assassin. Like so many paid killers, 
he has now been required to take the rap and 'clear 
Suharto's name' though in Indonesia's perverted system of 
· justice, no-one gets punished for bumping carmunists off. 
On the contrary, they get promotion and acclaim. 
Aidit's extra-judicial murder should be the subject of 
an international investigation which should not look only 
at Yasir's role but at the far more important role of 
Yasir's corrmander, Indonesia's present-day president. 
The 'disappeared' photographs 
Every time Yasir speaks about Aidit's murder, he never 
fails to mention that, during the hours Aidit was in his 
custody, an officer took a number of photographs. He says 
that the negatives were taken away for development, and 
he later received only three prints which he was then 
ordered to burn, along with the document Aidit allegedly 
wrote or dictated. Yasir may bemoan the loss of these 
photographs but many years later, an unidentified source 
in Indonesia sent seven of these photos to TAPOL, copies 
of which we have reproduced in a number of Bulletins. 
Taking 'the path of the law' 
The other 1985 image-polishing operation has been 
performed by a trusted law officer of the Indonesian 
Suharto's imagery dominated 
the fortieth anniverary of 
the founding of the 
Indonesian Arrred Forces on 5 
October. Thousands of women 
were used to hold up the 
boards. 
military, Major-General (ret'd) Ali Said who now presides 
over the country's Supreme Court. 
Ali Said described at great length for the benefit of 
the Indonesian press (Sinor Harapan, 30 September) how he 
was involved in the interrogation of PKI detainees soon 
after the I October 1965 affair and was instrumental in 
selecting the first conYTlunist leader to be brought for 
trial. This was Njono, for many years leader of 
Indonesia's main trade union federation, SOBSI, who was 
secretary of the PKI Jakarta Corrmittee in 1965. After 
performing as an interrogator, Ali Said then assumed the 
role of presiding judge of the Extraordinary Military 
Tribunal which tried Njono and sentenced him to death. 
(So much for the principle of 'fair trial'!) 
In December 1965, Suharto secured his own appointment 
by Sukarno as the officer responsible for convening the 
Extraordinary Military Tribunals which would try those 
allegedly responsible for the 1 October affair. By this 
time, Aidit, the man above all others who should have 
been the first to answer quest ions about the affair under 
Suharto's 'way of the law', was safely dead. 
What happened at the Njono trial is secondary to Ali 
Said's 1985 cOITITlernorative reminiscence. He focusses on 
describing how Suharto "prayed to the Almighty to be 
given the strength to uphold the law and not seek 
vengeance". Ali Said then explains how the Njono trial 
provided irrefutable proof of the PKI's involvement in 
the 1 October 1965 affair, omitting to mention that 
Njono's 'confession' which provided this 'irrefutable 
proof was retracted by Njono in court. 
While the Njono trial was still in progress, Ali Said 
says that he sent a letter to Suharto saying that if he 
{Suharto) was intending to ban the PKI, he should go 
ahead without awaiting the results of the trial. In case 
anyone doubts the existence of this letter, Ali Said 
assures us that it is stored with the documents of the 
Njono trial, adding, "I hope it hasn't been lost." The 
virtuous Suharto's reply was brief: "Don't think about 
anything else. Just concentrate on what you're doing." 
Ali Said recollects thinking at the time that the trial 
should not be allowed to delay banning the PKI. "After 
thinking it over for a long time, it became clear (to me) 
that Pak Harte's attitude was the right one, patiently 
waiting for strong legal grounds {sic) upon which to base 
the PKI ban." 
Twenty years on, Suharto is clearly worried about his 
image. Yasir, Ali Said, Wahono and others besides have 
done what they can to cover up any hint of his murderous 
and iron-fist methods. But the lengths they have gone to 
only emphasises just how much Suharto has to hide. 
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Subversion trials run into trouble 
The subversion trials now under way in many Indonesian cities are not going smoothly for the regime. Defendants and their 
lawyers are taking a stand on many issues and what is more, the disputes a.re being reported in some sections of the 
press. While some of the disputes are concerned with important procedural matters, the underlying cause for 
dissatisfaction is the anti-subversion law its.elf. 
Contesting the Anti-Subversion Low 
Members of the Petition-of-SO wrote to the President on 
8 October calling for the repeal of the law and insisting 
that it has "lost its reason for existence". According to 
The Australian (18 October), the letter was made public 
ten days later though we should add that it has not been 
reported in the Indonesian press. 
A report on opposition to the law has however been 
published by Tefll>O (23 November). It points out that the 
first comprehensive attack on the law was made by the 
team of lawyers who defended Hariman Sirgar, a student 
leader who was tried in 1974. The attack was made in 
their 'eksepsi' or demurrer, an occasion at the 
corrmencement of any trial for the defence to challenge 
legal aspects of the indictment or the court. Since then, 
many demurrers have made the same objections, arguing 
that the law which was introduced by presidential decree 
as a temporary measure in 1963 is so vague in its 
definition of 'subversive crime' that it can be, and 
indeed has been, used to try anything from political 
dissent to corruption, smuggling and even bribery. Some 
demurrers argue cogently that the way the 19-63 
presidential decree was enacted as law in 1969 was 
unconsti tut ion al. 
None of the complaints made in these defence demurrers 
has ever been acknowledged by any panel of judges, though 
the judges trying H.R. Dharsono did, according to the 
Petition-of-SO protest last month, go so far as to acrnit 
that "historically, the anti-subversion law was created 
in emergency conditions, by presidential decree which by 
nature was temporary .... " All judges are government 
employees and as such are required to join Korpri, the 
association of civil servants, which makes obedience to 
government ideology compulsory. This means that they are 
not free agents and are incapable of challenging the 
prosecution, still less challenging the law which the 
regime has used ever since the first 'G30S/PKI' trial in 
January 1966 to 'legitimise' its crackdown on political 
opposition. 
Fatwa's lawyers walk out in protest 
Many procedural abuses have caused the defendants and 
their lawyers to protest in court but the most effective 
protest was staged by the lawyers defending A.M. Fatwa 
when the court refused to call Ali Sadikin as a witness 
Abdul Qadir Djaelani challenging a 
court ruling. (Tempo, 23 November) 
Djoelani is accused of 'spreading 
hatred' and 'agitating the public 
against the government'. In a 
statement to the court entitled, 
"Jungle law is still valid after 40 
years of Indonesian independence", 
he retracted 'confessions' mode 
under interrogation, and said he was 
beaten unconscious, his hair and 
moustache were removed and he was 
prevented from saying Friday 
prayers. 
for the defence. When the lawyers walked out, Fatwa also 
walked out, insisting that because he is being tried 
under the anti-subversion law and can therefore be 
sentenced to death, he must by law have legal assistance. 
The lawyers had presented a list of six defence 
witnesses but the judges, using what they called their 
'discretionary powers of selection', were only willing 
to ollow four to appear, excluding Ali Sadikin. The 
lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court for a judgement, 
but when the judges hearing the Fatwa trial decided to 
proceed without awaiting this judgement, the lawyers 
walked out. This walk-out forced the judges to suspend 
the hearing. 
The ref us al to allow Ali Sadikin to appear was all the 
more incredible because he had testified only a week 
ealier in the Dharsono trial. It is more than likely, 
however, that his powerful impact at that trial explains 
the reluctance of Fatwa's judges to allow a repeat 
perform:mce. But the very close relationship between 
Sadikin and Fatwa over many years, not only in the 
Petition-of-SO group but also when Sadikin was Governor 
of Jakarta, made the refusal quite intolerable. The 
defence lawyers argued however that their primary 
objection lay in the fact that the judges do not have the 
right to select defence witnesses, according to the 1981 
Procedural Code, KUHAP. 
A week later, the court made a climbdown, announcing 
that Ali Sadikin would after all be allowed to appear. No 
explanation was given for the change of heart, nor had 
the Supreme Court issued any judgement on the affair. As 
with so many aspects of these subversion trials, it is 
obvious that decisions were taken behind the scenes on 
purely political grounds 
Events surrounding the calling of defence witnesses in 
the Dharsono have taken a rather different turn. In this 
case, the team of lawyers did not contest the court's 
decision to call only six of the twelve witnesses 
requested by the defence. However, it later transpired 
that two of the defence witnesses, Syafruddin 
Prawiranegara and retired general Sudirman, formerly 
commander of the East Java Divisional Command would not 
appear. Initially, this was said to be because of 
'illhealth' but, according to the Far Eastern Economic 
Review (28 November), Syafruddin's testimony has been 
"postponed indefinitely" because he is threatened with a 
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separate persecution for a sermon he preached in August. 
(See TAPQ Bulletin, No 71 for an extract from this 
sermon.) The Review suggests that the decision not to 
call these witnesses was taken by the defence. 
Other walkouts ••• and expulsions 
When the Muslim preacher, Abdul Qadir Djaelani tried to 
walk out from a hearing because his defence lawyers were 
not able to be present, the court ordered him to be 
returned to the court-room, then announced his expulsion 
from the court. The hearing then proceeded in the absence 
of both the defendant and the defence lawyers! 
The Mawardi Noor trial has also proceeded without 
either defendant or lawyers in court. In this instance, 
Noor was absent for reasons of ill-health, but the court 
refused to accept this without a doctor's certificate and 
ordered court officials to bring the defendant to court. 
His still refused to appear. A doctor's certificate was 
duly presented at the next session but the judges 
proceeded with the hearing nevertheless, again in the 
absence of both defendants and lawyers. 
Lawyers could now face legal proceedings themselves 
The chief prosecutor for Jakarta, Bob Nasution has 
turned on the defence lawyers, accusing them of staging 
an organised "strike" against the trials. He even alleges 
that the walkouts are a deliberate attempt to prevent the 
trials from being completed by December, by which time 
some of the defendants would have to be released •because 
the one-year period of detention without trial permitted 
under the Anti-Subversion Law will then expire. 
Al-Ickwan trials 
The editor of the banned Muslim periodical Al- Ikhwan, 
Irfan Suryahardi, and a distributor of the journal, A. 
Zonet Sumarlan are now on trial on charges connected with 
the publication. Irfan could faced the death penalty as 
he is being charged under the anti-subversion law while 
Zonet Sumerian could get anything up to 20 years. 
Al-lkhwan (The Brotherhood), published by Badon 
Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid (Mosque Youth Corrmunications 
Body), was banned in May this year. It was the successor 
to another Muslim periodical, Ar-Risala~ which was 
banned in October 1983 and had become a very popular 
journal, selling 10,000 copies every issue, not only in 
major Javanese cities but in Kalimantan, Lampung (South 
Sumatra) and Ujvng Panjang as well. 
Both trials are attracting large crowds who make no 
secret of their sympathy for the accused. The two men 
have shown their contempt for court procedures by 
refusing to comply with the wishes of the judges. Irfan 
Suryahardi 's trial was delayed several weeks because he 
refused to appoint defence lawyers, complaining that 
confinement to a cell made it impossible to contact 
lawyers freely. Arguing that the trial cannot proceed 
without defence lawyers because the accused faces a 
possible death sentence, the judges asked several legal 
organisations, among them the local Legal Aid Institute 
(LBH), to form a defence team. The LBH did not comply 
with this request, though two other groups did. 
During one hearing, the defendant's sister was taken 
into custody after she was discovered passing a letter to 
her brother. During another hearing, two members of the 
public were ordered out of the court and later arrested 
for shouting words of support for Irfan Suryahardi. 
The indictment alleges that in 1979, the defendant 
joined the 'Komando Jihad', a body which by all accounts 
exists only in the imagination of the government. In 
1980, he allegedly joined the Mosque Youth Corrmunications 
Body, and in 1982, he joined the Jogjakarta branch of the 
Indonesian Muboligh Corps (many of whose national 
leadership ore also on trial). The periodicals Irfon 
Suryahardi edited were allegedly established to promote 
an Islamic state and undermine the so-called 'Pancasila 
State'. 
As for Lieutenant-General (retired) AH Said, the 
Army's main 'upholder of the law' since 1965, he has 
threatened to initiate proceedings against the lawyers 
for "i,nsulting the courts". (No doubt, the anti-
subversion law could be stretched to cover that.) 
Single lawyers association foisted on the profession 
After years of effort, the government's leading law-
enforcer, Ali Said, Chairman of the Supreme Court, 
has succeeded in forcing the legal profession to 
create a single organisation for lawyers to replace 
the several organisations now in existence. 
The decision to push for this was taken at a 
meeting of the Supreme Court, the Department of 
Justice and chairmen of all the high courts, in 
February, 1982. The merger was seen as being a way 
"to foci Ii tote control over lawyers" (Tempo, 23 
November, 1985) 
The founding conference of the new association, 
Ikatan A dvokat Indonesia (Indonesian Association of 
Lawyers, diu no1 go all rhe governmenr's way oecause 
its favoured candidate for chairman, Golkar lawyer 
Albert Hasibuan was roundly defeated by Harjono 
Tj i trosoebeno, the present chairman of the most 
prestigious lawyers organisation, Peradin. Harjono is 
also defending some of the accused now on charges of 
subversion. Albert Hasibuan did however succeed in 
gaining the position of Secretary General. 
Crowds following the hearing outside the courtroom grew 
angry when the loudspeaker went dead every time the 
defendant or one of the defence lawyers spoke. 
A. Zonet Sumerian has repeatedly challenged court 
rulings and succeeded in forcing the prosecution to 
revise the charge-sheet because of blatant inaccuracies. 
He too has refused to have any legal defence. arguing 
that only Allah can defend him. 
Some newspapers, notably Suora Karya, the Golkar daily, 
go out of their way in their reports to depict the two 
men as being "unruly" and acting "strangely" because of 
their intransigent attitude. 
Bombong Sispoyo who was sentenced to death last year -was 
manhandled in court by troops for refusing to corl'1>1Y with 
court discipline. (Tempo, 23 November 198.5) 
Death-sentence prisoners may be moved to Nusakembongan 
Kompos reports (17 October) that three Muslim 
prisoners, two of whom are under sentence of death may be 
transferred to the Nusakembangan prison island, following 
a request for transfer made by the Jogjakarta High Court. 
The Court complains that the three men are "agitating and 
preaching" at Wirogunan Prison, Jogjakarta and are having 
a "disruptive" effect on other prisoners. 
The two under death sentence are Bc~imbang Sispoyo and 
Abdullah bin Umar. The third is Muhd. Sudiyonto who was 
given a life sentence earlier this year. A spokesman of 
the High Court also said Nusakembangan would be "the 
safest place" for the executions. He added that the 
executions w i II take place as soon as an order has been 
received from the President. 
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Tanjung Priok massacre on trial 
The trial of reti.red Lieutenant-General Hartono Rekso Dharsono which commenced in Jakarta on 19 August 1985 represents 
the regime's first attempt to deal head-on with the dissident retired army officers associated with the Petition-of-50 
group which has been circulating critical documents about the government since March 1980. 
Dharsono was not a signatory of the original petition 
but has been closely associated with its activities. 
ArrredForces (AERI) corrmpnder, General Benny Murdani has 
shown intense irritation with Army officers who turn on 
the government in their retirement. In most cases, the 
AERI leadership has been able to buy them off. Having 
tried but failed to buy off Dharsono, Murdani hopes to 
make an example of him as a warning to other officers so 
many of whom have gone into retirement in the current 
generational transfer and Armed Forces re-organisation. 
The regime is using the trial to establish a link 
between Dharsono and the Muslims already sentenced for 
alleged involvement in the bomb attack on two branches of 
the Bank Central Asia in October last year, thus hoping 
to discredit Dharsono and other 'disgruntled Army 
pensioners' in the eyes of past and present AERI 
officers. The main charge relates to a meeting in Jakarta 
on the evening of 18 September (four days after the 
Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984), attended mainly by 
Muslims, at which Dharsono allegedly delivered an 
'inflarrmatory lecture' inciting those present to turn to 
'armed rebellion' in revenge for the Tanjung Priok 
affair. 
The testimony of witnesses who attended this meeting 
hardly bears out this charge. According to the press 
reports available, the impression created in court was 
that, far from 'inciting youths to rebel' as the 
indictment alleges, Dharsono tried to calm people down 
and spoke about using 'constitutional' methods to protest 
against the Tanjung Priok tragedy. 
Dharsono has been charged under the anti-subversion act 
for 'attempting to undermine state security', 'inciting 
rebellion' and 'organising subversive meetings'. Apart 
from the 18 September evening meeting, the 'subversive 
meetings' refer to two meetings of the Petisi-50 group 
held on 15 and 18 September 1984 at which a White Paper 
was produced, presenting an account of the 12 September 
Tanjung Priok massacre sharply at variance with the 
official version announced by Murdani a few hours after 
the massacre, and calling for a fact-finding commission 
to investigate the incident. (See TAPOL Bulletif\. No 66, 
November 1984, page 2) 
Dharsono's presence at all three meetings is being used 
by the regime to link the BCA bombings with the Petisi-50 
group as a whole. 
Ali Sodikin testifies 
When Lieutenant-General (retired) Ali Sadikin, a (pre-
1965) commander of the Marine Corps who was governor of 
Jakarta from 19 66 till 1 977 appeared as a defence witness 
on 31 October, the courtroom was packed, with a crowd of 
some two thousand following the proceedings outside, 
clapping and cheering many of his statements. Sadikin was 
the first of six witnesses called by the defence. The 
defence wanted to call twelve witnesses but only six were 
allowed by the Court. 
Ali Sadikin has played a prominent role in the Petisi-
50 group. Meetings of its study-group are regularly held 
at his home and it was at such meetings that the White 
Paper was draft and then signed . He objected to the 
meetings being called 'illegal'. Admiral Sudomo, now 
Labour Minister, formerly corrmander of the top security 
corrmand, is a close neighbour and has dropped by while 
past meetings were in progress, so there is nothing 
secretive about them, Sadikin told the Court. 
He focussed attention on the White Paper and explained 
in detail the differences between its account of the 
Tanjung Priok incident and that of General Murdani. None 
of these details were given in press reports of Sadikin's 
testimony. He also asked for the White Paper to be read 
out in Court because it has never been published in the 
Indonesian press. Although the document was read in full, 
no newspapers gave any details of the contents. When 
defence lawyer Buyung Nasution questioned Ali Sadikin 
about the shooting in Tanjung Prick, the Court ruled that 
such questions were out of order. 
Script for trials written by Kopkamtib 
Ali Sadikin, the popular former governor of Jakarta, 
has no illusions about the political trials now under 
way. He knows too that once Dharsono has been found 
'guilty' and sentenced, other Petisi-50 members, 
himself included, are likely to be tried. Indeed, he 
and eight other Petisi members were ncrned in the 
indictment of Dharsono as his "accomplices ... each of 
whom will be brought as the accused in separate 
cases .•. " (This unprecedented indictment by proxy was 
challenged by Dharsono's lawyers as unlawful, but the 
Court allowed the indictment to proceed.) 
In an interview with UPI (26 October) Ali Sadikin 
warned that the verdicts are pre-determined. He said 
the script for the trials was drafted by Kopkamtib, 
the Army ' s Operational Command for the Restoration of 
Security and Order. "They've already set up the 
scenario. The military coaches the witnesses. 
Mentally, they are already down, broken." 
He described the Suharto government as "very 
arrogant ... much worse than Marcos. Sovereignty is 
not in the hands of the people. It is in the hands of 
the rulers. (Suharto) has the armed forces. He has 
all the government employees. Nobody controls him. 
People are still very afraid." 
'We are the only opposition who dares to say the 
truth in Indonesia. There are now only 15 or 20 
people to tell the people the truth. But I have a 
feeling that many people agree with us." 
Tanjung Priok victims testify 
Two young men who were shot in Tanjung Priok on 12 
September 1984 also appeared as witnesses for the 
defence. Yusron was one of 28 people tried earlier this 
year for participating in the demonstration which was 
shot down by troops. He was wounded several times and 
still has a bullet lodged in his body. (For more about 
his testimony at his own trial, see TAPOL Bulletin, No 
69, May 1985, page 7) The other man to testify about the 
events in Tanjung Priok was Eddi Nurhadi, a street vendor 
who did not attend the demonstration but returned home 
and went to sleep. He woke at 2 am, went out to find some 
food and was picked up by security officers who, for no 
apparent reason, shot him in the leg then left him 
unattended. The leg has since been amputated. 
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Severe sentences being passed 
A number of Muslims on trial in Jakarta and elsewhere 
have now come to an end, with severe sentences being 
passed. 
15 and 10 years in Ternate 
Two students tried on subversion charges for "assembling 
a group of students at the Sultan Hairun University and 
reading out a document entitled A Brief Report of the 
Bloody Tragedy in Tanjung Priok., North Jakarta, the 
contents of which were completely at variance with the 
government's explanation" were found guilty at the 
Ternate District Court in North Maluku. Hasbullah Sidik 
was given a sentence of 15 years, and Syamsi Haj i Rauf 
got a 10-year sentence. (Jakarta Post, 26 October) 
This trial got hardly any coverage in the national 
press. The only other reference available was a brief 
report in KOITf>OS (16 October) which described the charges 
in the same way as above and reported that the prosecutor 
had demanded sentences of 15 and l 0 years. 
20 years for preacher 
A Muslim preacher, Vayon Hendrayana, was found guilty 
of subversion for delivering 'inflarrmatory sermons' 
between June and September last year and was given a 
sentence of 20 years. (For a full report of the charges, 
see T APOL Bulletin, No 71, September 1985.) Evidence from 
prosecution witnesses made it clear that the security 
forces had been spying on meetings addressed by the 
defendant for many months. However, they waited till 
after the Tanjung Priok massacre before arresting him and 
charging him among other things with "inciting the 
masses" and "causing" the Tanjung Priok to occur, 
resulting in much loss of life. The prosecutor claimed in 
his surrming up that "the masses, most of whom were 
'little people' (rai<yat k.ecil), were easily taken in by 
his incitements". ( Suara Karya, l 3 September) 
After the prosecutor announced his demand for a life 
sentence, trial hearings had to be postponed several 
times because the defendant was seriously ill. 
12 years for broadcasting cassettes 
Ali Mosrum (Mudhoffar) is a well-known broadcaster for 
corrmercial radio in Surabaya, which is probably why his 
trial on charges of subversion attracted such huge 
crowds. He was accused of receiving cassettes of speeches 
by Amir Biki and Syarifin Maloko in Tanjung Priok on 12 
September 1984 which he reproduced and broadcast. He also 
distributed the cassettes as well as 'illegal leaflets' 
to his friends. The prosecutor felt this deserved a 20-
year sentence. The panel of judges at the Surabaya 
District Court was a little more 'lenient' and gave him 
12 years. 
During the trial, the defence protested at the Court's 
decision to exclude the public from the session when the 
tapes were re-played. The judges justified this on the 
grounds of "notional security". (Kompas, 10 September) 
8 and 5 years for 'Imron followers' 
Fuad had been in detention for four years already when 
he was brought for trial in Surabaya, accused of being 
associated with a Musi im congregation under Imron who was 
tried and sentenced to death several years ago. The 
prosecution asserted that, as a member of the Mosque 
Youth in Surabaya, he gave talks critical of Pancasila 
and the state constitution, arousing hostility towards 
the government. 
When sentence was passed, he was in a state of shock. 
His mother said afterwards that since his arrest, he has 
often had spells of silence and listlessness. 
The prosecutor who wanted a 15-year sentence is likely 
to appeal ago inst the Court's verdict .(Suara Karya, 9 
September} 
Islamic Crash-Course trials 
Six men tried for activities in the Lembaga Pendidik.an 
Pondok. Pesantren Kilat (Crash-Course Pesantren 
Educational Institute, or LPJK) have all been found 
guilty. Details of the charges against LPJK activities 
were given in TAPOL Bulletin, No 71. The heaviest 
sentence went to the two men tried in Surabaya: Simpuang 
Abdul M:dik got a 20-year sentence while Andri Harto was 
given a 12-year sentence. Both were found guilty largely 
on evidence from a witness named David Frans who was 
relied on heavily by the prosecution to link them with 
bombing incidents. The type of 'subversive' activities 
used to pass the heavy sentences was - preparing and 
circulating leaflets called "An Open Letter to the Armed 
Forces" and "Drag General Murdani to court to account for 
the Tanjung Priok incident". 
Andi Sukisno (21), Murdjoko (26), Faisal Fachri (21) 
and Sugeng Budiono (20), all tried in Malang, were each 
sentenced to 8 years. The prosecutor, who had asked for 
15-year sentences in all these cases, announced that he 
would appeal against the verdict. 
~I deputy-chairman gets 20 years 
H. Salim Qadar (50), a deputy-chairman of the 
Indonesian Corps of Mubalighs (lay-preachers) was given a 
sentence of 20 years. He was accused primarily of 
'inciting the Tanjung Priok demonstration' and delivering 
'inflarrmatory lectures' just before the incident. Several 
of the prosecution witnesses had clearly been spying on 
him in the months prior to September 1984, and accused 
him of attacking government policies such as the birth 
control prograrrme the sole-principle law. 
STOP PRESS 
West Papuan deportees face death penalty 
A PNG journalist who visited Jayapura in November was 
told by a provincial official that eleven of the 12 
deportees forced back to Irion Joya on 12 October (see 
page 1) would stand trial in the next few months, nine of 
them on heavy charges that could result in the death 
penalty. (Niugini News, 19 November) The official said, 
"If they killed somebody, the penalty is death." [He 
should have added that you don't need to kill anyone 
under the anti-subversion law to get the death penalty.] 
The journalist who met the deportees spoke of their 
"weary appearance". One had a black eye and another 
limped badly as they were taken out for a press photo. 
The report quoted statements made by the men's spokesman 
Izaak Rumpaisum, but he was clearly not speaking as a 
free agent as the prison director sat among the detainees 
during the interview. 
Foreign journalists reprimanded 
Three foreign journalists were given severe warnings 
by the government for articles about the current re-
organisation of the Armed Forces. Two, Lincoln Kaye 
and Paul Handley, are from the Far Eastern Economic 
Review and the third, Andree Feillard writes for 
Asiaweek. Only last year, the FEm lost its Jakarta 
correspondent, Susumu Awanohara. 
According to the Jakarta Post (8 November), they 
were accused of giving their readers a misleading 
conception of what is happening in the Armed Forces 
by using such terms as "unwanted transfer" and 
"reduced promotion possibilities". 
The Sydney Morning Herald reports that an issue of 
Asiaweek which contained an article about Papua New 
Guinea which commented on the situation in Irion Joya 
was withheld from circulation. 
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The Sand-Collectors 
by: Angelica Stual't 
From the br idge it was possible to observe the gruelling 
labour of the Balinese sand-collectors. This activity of 
the Bal inese (a curious occupation) held sensational 
appeal for tourists. Such observation was a somewhat 
vulgar pastime, a tinge sadistic, voyeuristic, indulged 
in each day by a motley group of Australian, French and 
German tourists whcm I recall bcking their plump bellies 
and flabby thighs each day on the beach adjacent to their 
luxurious hotel. The tourists were titillated, perhaps 
obtaining an understanaable if somewhat perverted 
satisfaction in the chasm which separated and protected 
them from the hellish work to which the Balinese women 
were chained. 
The procession of women bearing huge empty baskets atop 
their heads, ranging in age from 12 to 60 years, perhaps 
older, perhaps younger, trod the path through the mud, 
their steps leading further, deeper into the river, in 
which gradually were irrmersed their ankles, then their 
knees, then their thighs, then their buttocks, waist, 
breasts, neck and finally their heads. As they 
disappeared entirely beneath the surface of the river, 
only the baskets on their heads remained visible. At 
regular intervals their heads emerged, having scooped the 
sand from the river bed and deposited it in the basket 
whose cargo of sand and weight gradually increased. 
When the baskets were entirely filled, the procedure 
was repeated in reverse: heads reappeared from beneath 
the river sur face, then shoulders, breasts, navels, 
finally their full length was visible as these women 
moved, now encumbered by their burden, the product of 
th<Jir labour atop their heads which they dared not upset 
as the 5 rupiahs (a fraction of a US cent) which they 
received for the sand cargo represented each day the 
difference between starvation or survival for themselves 
and their families. Slowly, ponderously, they re-traced 
their steps, the punishing, exhausting climb up the steep 
hill to the road, their posture amazingly erect despite 
the cruel loads they were obliged the bear on their 
heads. 
Again and again, they repeated the grotesque procedure, 
from sunrise to sunset, children, pregnant women, aged 
women, throughout the suffocating heat, every day of 
their lives, obtaining 5 rupiahs per basket which at the 
end of each day's labour had accumulated (if their 
strength sustained) to 500 rupiahs, the wages for effort 
which seemed, to any observant tourist, almost 
unendurable. 
After several years during which a large part of their 
day was spent in this activity, irrmersed in often 
polluted water, the women gradually and almost inevitably 
contracted diseases of the bladder or the intestines, 
uterine infections, and so on and so forth. Many pf these 
diseases are irreversible. Medical facilities to treat 
these ailments that might be responsive to treatment did 
not exist in sufficient supply, and these women bore with 
spartan resignation the damage to their bodies which 
subsequently disabled their lives. 
This attitude, sometimes referred to as the 'remarkable 
Balinese submissiveness', had its source perhaps in 
despair, a sense of futility, in an experience, a memory 
which still seared deeply, branded into the consciousness 
or sub-consciousness of these Balinese - the ineradicable 
memory of the even ts of 1965, and the consequences of 
their effort to resist being reduced to beasts of burden, 
their struggle to recover their human dignity, their 
struggle to rise above subsistence living conditions. 
This struggle was crushed in 1965 with such efficient 
atrocity as to intimidate these Balinese and annihilate 
in them any such impertinent and subversive idea that it 
was somehow unnecessary for them to squander their lives 
in this form of slavery to the rupiah while other persons 
who seldom exert the slightest effort somehow manage to 
possess numerous yachts, mansions, irrrnense wardrobes and 
jewelry, a fraction of the cost of which could have 
restored the entire colony of Balinese sand-collectors to 
the world of the 1 iving. The rebellion of these Balinese 
was smashed with a bloodbath which imposed upon them, 
once and for all, a clear awareness of 'their place' in 
the established order. 
According to reports of Western observers assigned in 
New Zealand during 1965-66, the fiercest resistance to 
the overthrow of Sukarno occurred among the people of 
Bali. Following the coup that deposed Sukarno, Suharto's 
US-trained and supported troops perpetrated what 
conservative estimates describe as the slaughter of 
approximately one million human beings in Indonesia, a 
massacre described by Chomsky and 1-ferman as "the second 
largest holocaust of the 20th century". l) 
As punishment for having attempted to reclaim their 
human status, and as an example to deter further defiance 
(so essential a part of any assertion of autonomy by 
historically oppressed people), l 0 percent of the 
population of Bali were murdered by armed forces trained 
by the US government, whose methods of terrorisation were 
reminiscent of the tortures inflicted upon early 
Christian martyrs. Vast numbers of Balinese, including 
those who tried to resist the coup or who had simply had 
'the finger pointed at them', had their heads chopped 
off. Their heads were impaled atop tall, spiked columns 
which were placed at hideously regular ten-foot intervals 
on all the roads and footpaths throughout the island of 
Bali. People travelling the roads during that period 
would have found their routes decorated on both left and 
right sides by high pillars dripping blood from severed 
sections of tortured human bodies. And the traveller 
gazing upward saw the remnant of a human face shrivelled 
and contorted in agony. 
l) Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Poli ti cal 
Economy of Human Rights, Volume I, 1979, South End Press, 
Boston, pp 206, 207 . 
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